women in Taiwanese elections

March 18, 2013

One of the projects I’ve been working on over the past few months involves women in Taiwanese electoral politics.  So let me ask you a simple question:

Does Taiwan elect more women or fewer women than other countries?

What’s your initial reaction?  Ok, now let me clarify that the normal way to compare countries is to look at the percentage of women in the lower house of the national legislature.  So when you think about whether Taiwan elects only a few or a lot of women, don’t think about a certain 2012 presidential candidate or the former Vice President; you have to think about the Vice Speaker.  Now, are there a lot of people like her?

 

 

Thinking…

 

 

Thinking…

 

I’ll give you a hint: Taiwan is not average; it is either well above average or well below average.

 

 

Thinking…

 

 

Ok, this should be far enough down that I didn’t ruin the surprise.

 

 

If you answered that Taiwan elects a lot of women, you haven’t been reading the academic literature.  Scholars who have written about this topic complain incessantly about how the electoral system depresses the number of women elected to public office.  Of course, if you answered that Taiwan is well above average, you would also be entirely right.  Compared to the rest of the world, female politicians do quite well in Taiwan.

Currently there are 38 women in the legislature.  Taiwan’s 33.6% women ranks 23 of 189 countries worldwide.  Here’s the (in)complete list.  (It doesn’t list Taiwan because … well, unlike Comoros and San Marino, Taiwan is apparently not a real country.)  Most of the 22 countries ahead of Taiwan fit into one of two categories: they are either in Western Europe or not quite democratic.  Sweden is clearly better than Taiwan, but most countries can’t just adopt a Scandinavian political culture.  Rwanda is the only country in the world with over 50% women, but most countries don’t really want to go through a genocide and then install an undemocratic regime just to pump up their numbers of elected women.  For most of the world searching for a viable model, places like Mexico, South Africa, Argentina, and Taiwan might be the best places to look.  Does that list scream “commitment to gender equality!” to you?  Me either.  I usually think of those four countries as having quite male chauvinistic orientations.  And yet those are the high achievers on this list.

People in Taiwan generally fit into one of two categories: those who think that everything in China is better and those who think that everything in Japan is better.  On this measure, they’re both wrong.  China is slightly above the world average at 21.3%, but it lags far behind Taiwan.  Japan is dismal.  Only 7.9% of its lower house are women.  Yikes!  My native land is no star either: the USA House of Representative is only 17.8% female.

One last trivia question: Taiwan is far and away the best among liberal democracies in Asia.  In fact, only one country in Asia has more women in parliament than Taiwan.  Who is it?

 

Your first guess is wrong.

 

So is your second guess.

 

Hint: The dominant religion is Catholicism.

 

If that country wasn’t one of your first two guesses, then your third guess is wrong too!

 

Surprise! The answer is East Timor (38.5%).  Bet you didn’t see that coming.  (And for more unexpected results, Nepal is right behind Taiwan.)

 

Anyway, aren’t you glad to know Taiwan is a world leader in gender equality?  Sure, women are still underrepresented here, but they are less underrepresented here than most other places in the world.  Hooray!

KMT proposes referendum on nuclear power

February 27, 2013

The KMT has announced that it will support holding a referendum on whether to start operations at the 4th nuclear power plant (4NPP).

This is a stunning turn of events, at least to me.  They are venturing onto treacherous ground.  There are lots of ways this can go wrong for them, and only one way that it can turn out well.

Nuclear power divides along the traditional blue/green lines, though there have been defectors from both sides.  I recall one budget fight in the late 1990s in which the KMT demanded party discipline from everyone except for legislators from Taipei County, who were allowed to vote with their constituency.  Similarly, the DPP was not monolithically anti-nuclear either.  The polarizing moment came early in Chen’s presidency when he stopped construction on 4NPP.  Chen had won the presidency with 39%, and the DPP had roughly the same share of seats in the legislature.  The newly emerging blue camp had a clear majority, and nuclear power was the test case to see if the president or the legislature would dominate the government for the rest of the term.  Whatever deviance from party positions had previously existed was quickly overwhelmed by the partisan struggle for power.  Eventually, the KMT won out and the DPP was forced to resume construction on 4NPP.  If it wasn’t already clear, this episode indelibly branded the KMT and DPP as pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear parties.

The project has had a bumpy history, to put it mildly.  There have been numerous cost overruns, safety problems, construction delays, and various other snafus.  Of course, the site is near the Taipei metropolitan area, vulnerable to tsunamis, on an earthquake fault, and even sits atop a not-quite-dormant volcano.  The fact that Taiwan has three other (much older) nuclear power plants (with not entirely pristine safety records) has done little to qualm fears about whether 4NPP will be safe.  Fukushima sharpened all these concerns and forced Taiwanese to rethink whether nuclear power was a good idea.

During the 2012 presidential election, the KMT tried to take the nuclear issue off the table.  It promised to decommission the three existing plants on schedule.  4NPP would be opened, but not until it had been rigorously tested.  At the end of its scheduled life, Taiwan would be nuclear free.  Somehow, these verbal gymnastics allowed Ma to claim that he was simultaneously for (a) opening a new nuclear power plant and (b) making Taiwan nuclear free.  The DPP position was more straightforward.  They would not open 4NPP, and they would hasten the decommissioning of the old plants.  I think the KMT strategy largely worked.  Nuclear power did not seem to be a central issue in the 2012 campaign.

I have not seen specific polling data on support for nuclear power, but it is my impression that public opinion is shifting, perhaps decisively, away from the KMT.

 

Why is the KMT so politically committed to nuclear power?  Most importantly, they have committed enormous piles of money to this project over the past two decades.  They cannot simply walk away with nothing to show for it.  The DPP would beat over the head relentlessly for years and years.  How many schools, hospitals, roads, public housing, MRT lines, or flower festivals were sacrificed for 4NPP?  It would be strong evidence that the KMT had a flawed vision for the future and had stubbornly insisted on imposing that flawed vision on an unwilling population.  The KMT has been attacking the DPP for a decade over the 2001 showdown.  When the DPP stopped construction, they broke numerous contracts and had to pay heavy financial penalties.  Of course, the project was then resumed, so that money was just wasted.  However, if the plant never opens, this argument gets reversed: the DPP tried to save Taiwan an enormous amount of money, and the KMT wasted 10 more years of construction budgets.  For the KMT, reversing course is simply not an option.

There are also other reasons the KMT wants nuclear power.  One way to understand the KMT regime is as a construction state, much like the LDP’s Japan.  The ruling party hands out lots of construction contracts and turns these contracts into political support.  Some aspects are legal, some are hazy, and some are outright illegal.  However, it is pretty effective.  4NPP has been a 20 year gravy train of contracts to hand out.  (I hope I’m wrong about this.  Contracts used for this purpose often lead to shoddy public works.  This prospect terrifies me.)  Many manufacturers support nuclear power.  To be clear, they don’t care where the electricity comes from, but they can’t stomach the prospects of insufficient or unreliable power.  Many of the exporters that drive Taiwan’s economy want 4NPP opened because they believe it will provide steady and reliable electricity for the next few decades.  The KMT also listens closely to Taipower, the state run electricity company.  Taipower is deeply embedded in the KMT’s power structure.  The Economics Minister is a former Taipower executive, and the head of the Taipower workers’ union is a member of the KMT’s Central Standing Committee.  Taipower wants 4NPP.  It can be pushed and prodded to reluctantly try out the odd alternative energy project, but 4NPP is Taipower’s crown jewel.

 

If the KMT is so deeply committed to nuclear power, how is it possible that they can accept a referendum?  Admittedly, I didn’t think it was possible until they announced it.  I fully expected that they would make a big show of safety tests, have a blue ribbon commission pronounce the plant safe, and use their majority in the legislature to push away any remaining obstacles.  Apparently public opinion is shifting enough that they don’t feel this strategy is tenable.  We have seen several prominent blue camp supporters ask the KMT to reconsider its stance.  The one that struck me was the foundation associated with Fubon Financial Group.  If even powerful people in Fubon, which is betting heavily on further integration into the Chinese market, are willing to speak out against nuclear power, anyone in the blue camp can.  The pressure from within the blue camp coalition must be intense.

One thought is that the KMT is using the referendum as a mechanism to back away from nuclear power.  If the public votes against 4NPP in the referendum, the KMT will have a rationale for changing its position.  The public will be responsible for the economic consequences of the decision, not the KMT.  I don’t think this is correct.  (Or if it is, it is a terrible strategy.)  If the public repudiates 4NPP, they will effectively be saying that the policy the KMT has been doggedly pursuing over the past 20 years was not just wrong, it was so wrong that voters are willing to stomach wasting billions of dollars to reverse it.  Don’t think that voters will simply forgive the KMT for all that money.  The KMT insisted on spending it.  Just as a government reaps political benefits for doing things that turn out well, they are penalized for making poor choices.  The KMT might hope it can foist off that responsibility onto the people, but one of the axioms of democratic politics is that the voters are never wrong.  Someone has to take the blame if 4NPP never opens, and that someone will be the KMT.

Moreover, if President Ma loses a referendum this summer, he might as well just tattoo “lame duck” across his forehead.  He will be politically neutered.

No, the KMT cannot lose this referendum.  They have to win it.  The only way this turns out well for them is if a clear majority of voters vote against not starting operations at 4NPP.  This means that the KMT will have to fully engage the debate.  President Ma will have to commit completely and publicly to this project; he won’t be able to prevaricate the way he did in the presidential campaign.  The KMT will have to convince the electorate that nuclear power is safe, efficient, clean, reliable, and desirable.

Don’t assume that Ma will fail.  His biggest advantage is that there is an information asymmetry.  The government will have all the details about 4NPP and Taiwan’s electricity needs.  When they need to know something, they can simply make a phone call.  Opponents will have to satisfy themselves with publicly available data, which is far less thorough.  Because of this, the KMT will usually have more convincing evidence for their arguments than the opposition will.  They also have all the resources of the state at their disposal to publicize their arguments.  In the ECFA debate, we saw lots of advertizing touting the advantages of ECFA.  Every government press release was infused with a pro-ECFA message.  Heck, even our electricity bills had a pro-ECFA message on them.  Get ready for an even more intense campaign.

The anti-nuclear camp also has to worry about this turning into a straight blue/green fight.  Dissatisfaction with the Ma administration is high, but there are a lot of people who will grit their teeth, curse bitterly, and vote for him rather than support the DPP.  The anti-nuclear camp needs to make sure that blue camp supporters who are against nuclear power feel that nuclear power is not just a proxy for feelings about China.  Given that the two big parties are clearly aligned against each other on this issue and will be leading their respective camps, that might be challenging.

 

This will be unlike any previous referendum.  We really haven’t had true referendum yet.  All prior cases were really just exercises in mobilizing voters in a general election campaign.  The questions were always designed to be as uncontroversial as possible.  “Do you favor a competent national defense?”  “Should we have high economic growth?” “Are you against pedophilia?”  (Ok, maybe those weren’t the exact questions…)  This question will be designed to resolve a public policy issue, not to mobilize voters for a different election.  While the government will phrase the question in as advantageous a way as possible, this question will inevitably split the electorate into two clear sides.

One thing opponents don’t need to worry about is turnout.  In the past, one side mobilized and the other side boycotted.  Since referenda need 50% turnout to become binding, all failed.  The question will be phrased in the negative, something like “Do you favor not beginning operations at 4NPP?” so technically the KMT could ensure the failure of the referendum by boycotting.

However, the KMT needs to win politically, not legally.  Consider if turnout is 40% and 90% of the votes are “yes” votes.  What that demonstrates is that there are a lot of voters who are against nuclear power.  It does not demonstrate that anyone actually supports it.  If the KMT felt passive support were enough, they would have been better off just pushing 4NPP through the normal legislative process rather than asking for a referendum.  The KMT needs active support.  It needs more “no” votes than “yes” votes.

The DPP will lead the charge against nuclear power, and the KMT will have to lead the demands for nuclear power.  With both sides fully mobilizing, turnout will not be so important.  I expect that 50% will not be a problem, but even if turnout is only 48%, if one side wins by a clear margin, that will be decisive in the political battle.  If the KMT wins, they will, of course, go forward.  If they lose by a clear amount, the party will not be able to stomach flagrantly defying public opinion.  (President Ma might, but the politicians who still have to fight future elections will not.)

I’m still stunned that the KMT has chosen this path.  However, they have cast their lot, and we are in for an interesting spring and summer.

DPP declares war

January 15, 2013

Yesterday the DPP held a big demonstration here in Taipei, and, for the climax, they announced they would begin a recall campaign against President Ma and several KMT legislators.  I have several thoughts about this.

First, the video they showed of President Ma calling on his supporters to recall President Chen in 2006 was extraordinary.  Ma systematically destroyed all the arguments he might make today to delegitimize the DPP’s actions.  If I were the DPP, I would buy TV commercials and play that clip over and over.  I’m sure Ma never dreamed that speech would come back to haunt him.  Politicians never expect that they will someday be in the same position as that incompetent, immoral jerk they are attacking.

Second, this is a great example of how extraordinary tactics become ordinary.  In 2006, the KMT probably thought that they were facing very rare and extreme circumstances.  After all, as they saw it, Chen was unpopular, corrupt, and he had stolen the presidency.  Moreover, the only thing he could do to deal with this was take extreme positions on national security that might endanger the country’s future.  In that context, extreme measures like a recall were justified.  Then, to give the recall the broadest possible coalition of support, they tried to package it as a part of normal, democratic politics (as per Ma’s aforementioned speech).  Whether or not the recall was appropriate under the extreme circumstances of 2006, the KMT had introduced it into the arsenal of acceptable political tactics.  Fast forward to yesterday.  Su Tseng-chang went out of his way to argue that this recall effort is not due to any extraordinary circumstances.  Ma is simply extremely ineffective and unpopular, and this is how a normal opposition party should act in such circumstances.  Don’t expect this to be the last time Taiwan sees a recall movement, and the next time will probably be under even milder circumstances than this time.

Third, this episode suggests to me that four years is just too long between elections.  Taiwan really needs mid-term elections or shorter terms.  If there were a mid-term election a year from now, the DPP would probably just wait for that.  Instead, they have to wait three more years to register their dissatisfaction, and that is simply too long.  Instead of having a legitimate, regularized process in which the opposition party had an opportunity to strip an unpopular president of his majority (or an embattled president had an opportunity to reassert his popular support).  Instead we will have a process that one side will claim is illegitimate (“It’s just creating chaos in society.”) and will have almost no chance of changing the balance of power.  The politicians set up this system because they hate facing elections all the time.  Elections are expensive, messy, and politicians always feel that they get in the way of good governance.  In the 1990s, there was a major election nearly every year, and the people in power hated it.  This system, with only one national election every four years, was their dream.  Finally, they could ignore politics and get on with governing.  Well, it turns out that you can’t get away from electoral politics in a democracy.  Public opinion needs an outlet at regular intervals.  This is especially critical when public opinion has changed significantly since the most recent election.  Of course, you can’t design institutions for stable or volatile public opinion, so it is important to have shorter intervals.

I don’t think the politicians will learn this lesson from this episode, but it would be nice if they did.  What could they do to fix things?  Four years is about right for a presidential term.  I liked the old three year term for legislators, but I don’t think they will ever go back to that.  I also understand why you want to align legislative and presidential terms.  If they won’t go to three year terms, two year legislative terms are a non-starter.  The best option might be to stagger four-year terms, with half the legislators being elected in the presidential year and the other half in the mid-term.  (Ideally, they would kill two birds with one stone and just double the size of the legislature.  Ok, ideally they would take the opportunity to change to an MMP or open list PR system with 100 seats elected every two years.)

(Are local elections mid-term elections?  Not really.  First, they only affect power at the local level.  Second, they aren’t located at the midway point in Ma’s term.  The county elections are close to the right time (Dec 2013), but the direct municipality elections are not held until well over halfway though Ma’s term.  About 2/3 of the population live in direct municipalities, and they will have to wait until Dec 2014 to vote.  Maybe if you held all local elections in March 2014, that could serve as an effective mid-term.  Right now, not so much.)

Fourth, how much chance does the DPP have of success in any of these recall efforts?  If the object is to actually recall anyone, the answer is almost none.  The presidential recall is fairly simple.  One fourth of the legislature needs to ask for a recall proposal.  Then two-thirds of the legislature has to approve it.  Then half the electorate must turn out in a recall election, and half of those voting must vote for recall.  The DPP will be able to propose a recall and force a vote of the full legislature.  However, that is as far as it will get.  They are never going to get two-thirds.  The legislative process is more complex.  First, the DPP has to collect signatures from at least 2% of the electorate in the district asking for a recall proposal.  If they pass that hurdle, then they have to collect signatures for the recall itself from 13% of the electorate.  Then you have an actual recall election.  For the official to be recalled, you need half the electorate to turn out and “yes” must win a majority of those votes.  Let’s look at those numbers with a concrete example.  Suppose the DPP wanted to recall Lee Hung-chun 李鴻鈞 in New Taipei 4th District.  Lee won the district over Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 by a margin of 103165-94126 (51.%-46.6%).  There were 267836 voters, and the turnout was 77.2%.  For simplicity, let’s assume there is no change in the number of eligible voters.  To ask for the recall, the DPP needs to collect 5357 signatures.  That is easy.  However, they then need to collect signatures from 34819 voters.  In other words, they need about 1/3 of the people who actually voted for them last year to sign the petition.  When you consider how much harder it is to collect signatures than to win votes, that is a formidable task.  Votes are anonymous, a lot of voters are outside mobilization networks, many voters are only tepid supporters, and many will be unwilling to recall a politician.  It would take a major effort, but getting this 13% is not an impossible hurdle.  Then they would hold the actual recall election.  The rules are the same as those for a referendum, and by now Taiwanese voters have had plenty of practice with referenda.  The crucial threshold is the 50% turnout, so opponents simply do not turn out to vote.  That means that the DPP will have to mobilize the full 50% of the electorate, or 133918 votes, all by itself.  Recall that they could only get 94126 votes in the general election, even with a concurrent presidential election.  The possibility of besting that number by nearly 50% in a recall election is remote.  KMT legislators in safe districts or even tossup districts aren’t going to have nightmares about a DPP recall effort.  There are, however, three KMT legislators in very green districts, Chang Chia-chun 張嘉郡 in Yunlin 1, Weng Chung-chun 翁重鈞 in Chiayi County 1, and Lin Kuo-cheng 林國正 in Kaohsiung 9.  Could the DPP recall them?  In Yunlin 1, Tsai Ing-wen won 56.2% of the votes.  However, this only amounts to 36.6% of the total electorate.  In Chiayi 1, Tsai’s 58.8% of the actual vote is only 42.8% of the electorate, and in Kaohsiung 9, she won 56.1% of the electorate but only 42.2% of the electorate.  In other words, the DPP would have to beat Tsai Ing-wen’s vote total by a large margin to successfully recall a KMT legislator even in one of these very green districts.  Realistically speaking, that just isn’t going to happen.

Fifth, I’m sure the DPP has done these calculations, and they know this recall movement isn’t going to actually recall anyone.  So why are they doing it?  This is all about the process.  They need to give their supporters some way to vent their anger and frustration.  There is no national-scale election coming up right away, so this is what the DPP can do.  Inflamed supporters can direct their passion to organizing signature campaigns.  Moreover, the media will have to cover this process, so for the next few months they will be talking about whether Ma is really doing THAT bad of a job and deserves to be recalled.  It also might be that Su Tseng-chang is feeling criticism that he hasn’t been an effective opposition leader over the past year and feels the need to actively do something.  At any rate, I’m not sure this is a wise course for the DPP.  This declaration of all-out war on the KMT is certain to create something of a backlash among blue supporters, and it is likely to fail (to recall anyone).  Moreover, the DPP is knocking down one of the unwritten rules, that when you win an election you get to serve out the full term.  The KMT tried to recall Chen in 2006; now the DPP is expanding that to a group of legislators.  It doesn’t take too much imagination to wonder if mayors are next, especially if any of these recalls come unexpectedly close to success.  The DPP is opting for an aggressive strategy that might eventually come back to haunt them, in the same way that Ma Ying-jeou’s demand in 2006 to recall President Chen is probably causing him a bit of consternation right now.

By-elections in Taichung

December 19, 2012

After nearly a year in hibernation, Frozen Garlic has awoken!  Apparently, an election has broken out!

At the end of November, the Taiwan court system finally rendered a verdict in one of the myriad corruption cases.  Most of these cases seem to disappear into the file cabinets, but in this one, the court found legislator Yen Ching-piao 顏清標 and Taichung City Council Speaker Chang Ching-tang 張清堂 guilty of corruption.  Both have been stripped of their seats.

(By the way, the corruption in question involved spending public funds to visit KTVs and other places where singing may not have been the main entertainment attraction.  Supposedly, they spent several million NT.  In the grand scheme of things, this is probably one of the more innocuous incidents of corruption they have been involved in.  It isn’t very much money, and their defense, which I do not doubt, is that everyone got reimbursed for these sorts of “public expenses.”  Both are deeply embedded in the systemic corruption of local factions and have almost certainly been involved in far grander abuses of the public purse.  Moreover, A-piao is no run-of-the-mill faction politician — he came to prominence as one of the top organized crime leaders in central Taiwan.  So I find it slightly amusing that these guys have seen their political careers end for a fairly trivial offense.)

There are two interesting stories.  Most of the attention will be on the contest to fill the empty Taichung 2 seat, so let’s start with that one.  The Taichung 2 district boundaries were drawn specifically for Yen Ching-piao.  His best town, Shalu, was put into Taichung 2 with the rest of his base instead of Taichung 1.  This created a bit of a population imbalance as well as a political imbalance, since the blue camp is quite a bit stronger in Taichung 2 than Taichung 1 and Shalu, where the KMT is particularly strong, exacerbates the difference.[1]  In fact, Taichung 2 is easily the blue camp’s strongest district in the old Taichung County.

Back in 2006 or so when Yen was settling into the new district, the alternative for the KMT was to put another incumbent Black faction legislator, Chi Kuo-tung 紀國棟, into the district.  Eventually, the KMT resolved the roadblock by putting Chi on the party list.  Now that Yen is out, the KMT would prefer for Chi to take the seat.  This would free up a spot on the party list for someone else, keep the seat for the KMT and the Black faction, and put a less controversial person into the seat.  However, that is not going to happen.  The KMT learned (or should have learned) a lesson a couple of years ago when it ran a list legislator for in a by-election in Tainan City.  The DPP candidate had an easy argument.  “If you vote for her, she will still be in the legislature and the empty seat will effectively be filled by some other KMT party list person who doesn’t represent you.  If you elect me, this district will have two local legislators.”  Chi might want to take over the seat in 2016, but he probably doesn’t want to run an expensive and risky campaign right now, especially if he has to tell people that a vote for him is equivalent to a vote for an outsider.

Anyway, someone else wants the seat.  Yen Ching-piao’s son, Yen Kuan-hen 顏寬恒, is planning to run.  I don’t know much about the younger Yen except that he had considered running for Shalu Township mayor in the past, and he looks a lot like his father.  The father was not a formal member of the KMT.  Probably both sides found it convenient to maintain the fiction that Yen was an independent, given his controversial background.  The younger Yen is a KMT member, and he is the only person to register for the KMT’s nomination.  So he’ll probably be the KMT candidate.  Running a family member to appeal directly to the voters for justice for a disgraced or convicted politician is a time-honored tradition in Taiwanese politics.  It makes a lot of sense when you can claim some sort of unfair suppression.  Former President Chen’s son has run twice in the last three years making precisely this sort of appeal.  I’ve never understood why it should work in cases like Yen’s, when he can’t really claim innocence or political persecution.  However, it often seems to be effective, so it might work for Yen as well.

The DPP has drafted a city council member, Chen Shih-kai 陳世凱.  I don’t know a lot about Chen except that he is more of an image politician than a grassroots-type politician.  He is in his first term in the city council, and he isn’t very closely associated with any particular locale the way that Yen is based in Shalu.

How will this unfold?  The KMT hopes to ride Yen Ching-piao’s extensive local organization and connections to victory.  The DPP wants to turn this into a referendum on President Ma.  As I said before, this is a strong KMT district, so it might be strange that the KMT wants to talk about local things and the DPP wants to talk about party politics.  However, both parties are right.  President Ma’s satisfaction ratings are dismal right now, and voters might be eager to send the KMT a message.  Moreover, if the by-elections from 3-4 years ago are any indication, the DPP is quite capable of winning this sort of race.  Turnout is typically around 40% in by-elections, and it might be that without a high-profile mayoral or presidential candidate, KMT supporters just don’t turn out.  The DPP won several by-elections 3-4 years ago in territory even more hostile than Taichung 2, and Ma’s satisfaction ratings are even worse now than they were then.  If Chen turns out to be a competent candidate, he has a good chance of winning this seat for the DPP.

The second, less obvious, story is the more interesting one to me.  This story is about the KMT’s local factions and their fight to adapt to the new Taichung City.  Unlike the first story which will be resolved by the end of January (and probably rendered irrelevant when Chi Kuo-tung takes the seat from the winner in 2016), the story of factional evolution will be unfolding over the next few years.

Before the merger of Taichung City and Taichung County, the two had completely separated local political environments.  City politicians didn’t have much to do with county politics or vice versa.  In Taichung County, KMT politics were dominated by the Red faction and the Black faction.  Taichung County has the most institutionalized factions of any city or county in the country.  The Red and Black factions fought out every electoral contest, from legislator to town council, in the county.  In a way, this made Taichung County much easier to understand since you could just ask who was Red and who was Black.  The factions can trace their roots all the way back to the first county executive election in the early 1950s, when Lin He-nian 林鶴年 handed out red name cards and Chen Shui-tan 陳水潭 handed out black cards.  Those two dominated local politics in the 1950s and then passed their support down to the next generation.  Indeed, the two factions are still sometimes called the Lin and Chen factions.  Over the past half-century, the Red faction has been the more successful of the two, producing a speaker of the Provincial Assembly in the 1970s and a speaker of the legislature in the 1990s.  As in most counties, the KMT tried to ensure that neither faction became too powerful by balancing them against one another.  This meant that when one faction controlled the county executive, the other controlled the county assembly.  Prior to the merger in 2010, the Black faction held the executive, while the speaker, Chang Ching-tang, was from the Red faction.

KMT factions in Taichung City were less stable.  Traditionally, people would talk of the Chang and Lai factions.  However, the Lai faction hadn’t really been powerful since the 1980s.  The Chang faction was named for Chang Chi-chung 張啟仲, who was mayor in the 1970s, and was sustained by his protégé, longtime legislator Hung Chao-nan 洪昭男.  However, Hung retired a few elections ago.  The current leader of the Chang faction is Chang Hung-nien 張宏年, who was speaker of the Taichung City Council before the merger.  Chang Hung-nien’s Chang faction still retains the Chang faction name, but it is not really the same thing as Chang Chi-chung’s Chang faction.  In fact, in today’s Taichung City, you are as likely to hear people talk of the Hu-Lu faction (named for mayor Jason Hu 胡志強 and legislator Lu Hsiu-yen 盧秀燕) as of the Chang or Lai factions.  The Hu-Lu faction, however, is more of a coalition of two people than a full-fledged faction.

So the merger of Taichung City and County in 2010 brought about a merger of these two very different factional systems.  It didn’t go well for any of the factions.  In Taichung County, the two factions lost most of their institutional power.  They had alternated control of the county executive and dominated most lower-level elections.  The Black faction’s power base was arguably in the 21 township mayors, but both had faction members scattered throughout the township councils as well.  With the merger, these offices were abolished.  The Red faction may have survived the merger in better shape, since its power base was in the Farmers Associations, which continued to exist, but both lost a lot of institutional power.  Moreover, the two factions did poorly in the one arena left to them, the new city assembly.  With too many incumbents running for a limited number or seats, the 2010 election was particularly bloody for the two county factions.

The city factions did not lose as much institutional power in the merger, since there were no townships in the city.  However, since the smaller city merged with the more populous county, the city factions found themselves at a numerical disadvantage.  In the end, the county factions struck a deal, and the Red and Black factions took the speaker and vice-speaker seats, leaving the city factions in the cold.

Now, two years later, Red faction speaker Chang Ching-tang has been stripped of his seat, and this might give us some insight on how the various local factions are reorganizing in the new Taichung City.  One might expect the losers of the last elections to try to form a new coalition.  The most obvious loser was former city council speaker, Chang Hung-nien, who wanted to remain speaker (or at least vice-speaker) but was completely shut out.  The lesson of the last election should have been that, as long as the battle was county vs city, he could never win.  I would expect that he has spent the past two years trying to build ties with county politicians to construct a new faction that crossed the old administrative district borders.

In fact, events unfolded without much hubbub (which is quite interesting to me).  As might be expected, the KMT tabbed (Black faction member) vice-speaker Lin Shih-chang 林士昌 to take over as speaker.  However, instead of nominating a Red faction member for vice-speaker, the KMT chose Chang Hung-nien.  Lin and Chang won the election with minimal fanfare.

Now, I don’t know whether Chang has tried to merge his faction with the Red faction or whether the old factional systems have completely collapsed and are undergoing a fundamental reorganization or whether this is an isolated case and nothing significant has happened.  I haven’t seen much in the media about factional politics.  However, something has to be happening.  The merger upset the basic environment, and the various factions have to be doing something to adapt to their new challenges.  We will have a much clearer idea of what is happening after the 2014 elections, but I think we are starting to see the first clues that the old systems are evolving.

Whether they are able to survive could be critical for Taiwan’s future.  Taichung is the tipping point between the green south and the blue north, and the KMT has managed to hold it on the blue side thus far.  If the local factions disintegrate or one of them defects to the DPP (as happened in Chiayi), the national balance of power could swing to the DPP.  We’ll all pay more attention to the upcoming legislative by-election, but the evolution of the KMT’s local factions will eventually be far more consequential.


[1] The DPP won Taichung 1 in 2012.  Maybe they should thank Yen for insisting that Shalu be in Taichung 2.

still alive

October 30, 2012

This is just a post to keep my blog looking like it is still alive.  I’ll be back when election news starts to heat up.  In the meantime, let’s all be thankful that Taiwan doesn’t have anything as inane as the American electoral college.

Freezing Garlic

January 25, 2012

I haven’t had time to write anything for the blog recently.  Apparently my real job wants all my time.  In lieu of an actual post, I offer this vignette:

My wife recently informed me that she tried freezing garlic.  She hadn’t considered the possibility until she was inspired by a story about President Ma’s New Year’s shopping excursion at the traditional market with his mother.  The vendors all tried to give him free things, and he welcomed all gifts except for garlic.  He got so much garlic during the campaign that his freezer is full of the stuff.

I’ve been writing a blog entitled “frozen garlic” for two years, and my wife needs President Ma to click the switch in her brain.  Go figure.

Happy New Year.

DPP all-stars

January 18, 2012

Which DPP candidates did well, and which were terrible?  We could judge this by who won and who lost, but that overlooks the very important factor that it is a lot easier to win in a place like Tainan than it is in a place like Hsinchu County.  So instead of looking at winning and losing, I’m going to compare each candidate’s performance to a party baseline.  I’m using the presidential vote as a baseline, mostly for convenience.  The CEC still hasn’t released the downloadable precinct level election data [I think they are waiting to finish all the recounts], so this is the fastest way to put together a small data set.

This is still very quick and dirty.  Many districts cross township borders, and I don’t have time to figure out the exact presidential votes in these districts.  Instead, I am just putting the entire township total into one district or another.  For example, Shilin 士林 District is split between Taipei 1 and Taipei 2.  Most of it is in Taipei 2, but the Tienmu 天母 area is in Taipei 1.  I put the entire Shilin District into District 2.  Since the Tienmu area leans heavily to the DPP, this has the effect of making District 1 look greener than it really is and making District 2 look bluer than it really is.  So this is not perfect, but this is the best I can do right now.

 

Let’s look at the All-Stars.  Here are the candidates who beat Tsai Ing-wen by at least 4%.  Districts with asterisks are ones that might not be so accurate.

 

District Name Tsai LY% + Win?
Taitung* Liu Chao-hao

0.305

0.416

0.111

Y
Pingtung 3 Pan Men-an

0.569

0.666

0.097

Y
Taichung 1 Tsai Chi-chang

0.467

0.545

0.079

Y
Penghu Yang Yao

0.457

0.534

0.078

Y
New Taipei 2* Lin Shu-fen

0.511

0.587

0.077

Y
Taichung 6 Lin Chia-lung

0.452

0.518

0.065

Y
Kaohsiung 4 Lin Tai-hua

0.586

0.648

0.062

Y
Hsinchu Cnty Perng Shaw-jiin

0.309

0.370

0.061

 
Taichung 4 Chang Liao Wan-chien

0.407

0.463

0.056

 
Yunlin 2 Liu Chien-kuo

0.555

0.610

0.055

Y
Tainan 3 Chen Ting-fei

0.562

0.617

0.055

Y
Tainan 2 Huang Wei-cher

0.629

0.681

0.052

Y
Taoyuan 2 Kuo Jung-chung

0.446

0.498

0.052

 
Taoyuan 3* Huang Jen-shu

0.351

0.399

0.048

 
Taichung 7 Ho Hsin-chun

0.460

0.503

0.043

Y
Changhua 4 Wei Ming-ku

0.463

0.502

0.040

Y

 

Liu Chao-hao 劉櫂豪 tops the list, but a third of Taitung’s population is Aborigines who vote in the presidential election but not in the district legislative election.  Aborigines vote overwhelmingly for the KMT, so Liu benefitted tremendously by not having them in his district.  Liu probably ran ahead of Tsai, but not by much.  I don’t think he belongs on this list.  He owes his victory to a split KMT vote, not to a spectacular personal vote.

Pan Men-an 潘孟安 in Pingtung 3 is in second place.  His district also has quite a few aborigines, but they are a significantly smaller percentage of the population than in Taitung.  Pan’s bonus is inflated, but he clearly belongs on this list.  The KMT ran a very weak candidate, and Pan crushed him.  Several other candidates had similar situations – a clear DPP majority in the district, a very weak KMT candidate, and a crushing victory.  These candidates include Lin Tai-hua 林岱樺, Huang Wei-cher 黃偉哲, and Chen Ting-fei 陳亭妃.

One person who you might think belongs in the above category but actually does not is Lin Shu-fen 林淑芬 (New Taipei 2).  Her district is only marginally pro-green.  In fact, it is almost exactly identical to neighboring New Taipei 3, which the DPP won by a razor-thin margin.  Lin Shu-fen turned her slight advantage into an overwhelming victory.  Note that the four candidates in the previous category and Lin Shu-fen are all incumbents.

There were five DPP candidates who won in majority blue districts.  In these districts, Tsai had less that 50%, but the legislative candidate significantly outpolled her and was able to transform defeat into victory.  These are the DPP superstars this year.  Three of the five are in Taichung, where the Tsai Ing-wen did not have a majority any district.  However, Tsai Chi-chang 蔡其昌, Lin Chia-lung 林佳龍, and Ho Hsin-chun 何欣純 ran 7.9%, 6.5%, and 4.3% ahead of her.  You can really see the importance of good candidates in these close Taichung races by the fact that Tsai Ing-wen actually got a higher vote share in Taichung 3 and Taichung 8 than in any of these three districts.  However, the DPP candidates in those two districts were extremely weak.  (Taichung 3 is Michael Turton’s home district.  This should make him puke.)  The other two DPP superstars were Yang Yao 楊曜 in Penghu and Wei Ming-ku 魏明谷 in Changhua 4.  Note that none of these five were incumbents.

Finally, there are three candidates who did very well in a losing effort.  Perng Shaw-jiin 彭紹瑾 and Chang Liao Wan-chien 張廖萬堅 both ran well ahead of Tsai, but they started from such a deep hole that even this nice performance didn’t come close to victory.  Kuo Jung-chung 郭榮宗 in Taoyuan 2 very nearly joined the superstar category.  However, he started from a deeper hole than any of those five, as Tsai only got 44.6% of the vote in his district, and it was a two candidate race with no minor candidates to siphon votes away from the KMT candidate.  Kuo ran 5.2% ahead of Tsai; he needed to run 5.5% ahead.  Regardless, Kuo, Perng, and Chang Liao can all hold their heads high in defeat.

Huang Jen-shu 黃仁杼 probably doesn’t belong on this list.  Part of Zhongli City is in Taoyuan 6, and that part, which has a heavy military population, is overwhelmingly blue.  Tsai’s vote includes all of Zhongli City, so it looks low. Tsai’s vote in Taoyuan 3 is higher, and Huang probably did not run far ahead of her, if at all.

 

I’ll look at the poor performers next time.

technocrats and electoral reform

January 17, 2012

In the aftermath of the elections, everyone is scrambling to determine which seats are empty and who should fill them.  I don’t have much to say now about those choices except that most media reports suggest the new Premier and Vice Premier will be Chen Chong 陳沖 and Chiang Yi-hua 江宜華 (currently Vice Premier and Interior Minister), a couple of technocrats.  I want politicians!  Look, I understand that the Ma is worried about the international financial markets, but didn’t he learn his lesson before with Liu Chao-hsuan 劉兆玄?  The Premier needs to be good at political communication, not just good at understanding public policy.  [Frozen Garlic is probably the only voice arguing for more 政客!]

 

Speaker Wang Jin-pyng 王金平 made my day today by suggesting that electoral reform might be a good idea.  I love this guy!  He is worried by the disproportionality of the current system, the fact that it crushes small parties, and, most of all, that the blue areas are becoming bluer and the green areas are becoming greener.  He probably feels this personally, since the KMT incumbent in his hometown got swept away in the local DPP tide.

As I wrote a couple of months ago, I absolutely hate the current system.  Almost anything would be better, including going back to the old system.  The DPP’s preferred option is a MMP (mixed member proportional; for details, see the linked essay) system.  However, after watching the DPP’s debacle in determining its party list this year, I don’t think an MMP system would be the best choice for Taiwan?  What would be the best choice?  I believe an Open List Proportional Representation system would fit the bill almost perfectly.

I’m not going to get too excited, though.  While the Liberty Times report was very positive, the United Daily News report was much more reserved.  Lots of people in the KMT like the current system since they believe it works for their party and for them personally.  As they [reasonably] point out, the DPP was the party that insisted on the change in 2005.  Now that the DPP has lost a couple of elections under the system, it has decided that maybe this system isn’t so great.  In other words, you got what you wished for, so now you have to live with it.  [I will never forgive Lin Yi-hsiung 林義雄 for this disastrous electoral system.]

 

One thing the DPP has discussed is asking the Council of Grand Justices to rule whether the current electoral system violates the constitutional principle of each vote being equal.  I don’t like this idea at all.  The electoral system is written in the constitution.  It can’t be unconstitutional if it is in the constitution.  I certainly don’t want unelected judges to decide which part of the constitution is more constitutional than some other part of the constitution.  If you want to change the constitution, don’t take the lazy route and rely on judges.  That would set a very dangerous precedent.  The solution has to come through the political process of amending the constitution.

Grading my LY prediction

January 15, 2012

Seven week before the election, I classified all 73 seats into one of five categories.  Let’s see how I did.  Here is what I wrote:

Here’s my up to date handicapping of all the races.  It still looks like the blue camp will retain a majority, but that is not a sure bet by any means.  The hardest line to draw in this particular exercise was the one between “leans blue” and “tossup”.  On another day, the two might have had 15 and 16 districts, respectively.  I also think that the green camp is likely to win well more than half of the current tossup group.

Keep in mind that the blue camp will win all six aboriginal seats.

I’m still basing this all on a small KMT overall victory, say about 52-48.  If the DPP wins the presidency by 52-48, they will probably win all the tossups plus a couple others, such as New Taipei 6, Taichung 3, Miaoli 1, and Penghu.  The basic point is that I can imagine scenarios in which the DPP wins a majority without stretching my imagination too much.

The KMT won the presidency by 6 points, and, more importantly, the blue camp beat the green camp by about 9 points, so my predictions should be overly optimistic for the DPP.  Here is the table.  KMT wins are blue, and DPP wins are red (green is hard to see).

Safe blue (14) Leans blue (20) Tossup (11) Leans Green (17) Safe Green (11)
Taipei 1 Taipei 3 Taipei 4 Taipei 2 New Taipei 2
Taipei 6 Taipei 5 New Taipei 4 New Taipei 3 Tainan 1
Taipei 7 New Taipei 1 New Taipei 7 New Taipei 5 Tainan 2
Taipei 8 New Taipei 6 New Taipei 10 Taichung 1 Tainan 3
New Taipei 8 New Taipei 12 Taichung 6 Taichung 7 Tainan 4
New Taipei 9 Taichung 2 Kaohsiung 1 Taichung 8 Tainan 5
New Taipei 11 Taichung 3 Kaohsiung 2 Kaohsiung 5 Kaohsiung 4
Taichung 5 Taichung 4 Kaohsiung 8 Kaohsiung 6 Yunlin 2
Taoyuan 6 Kaohsiung 3 Taoyuan 1 Kaohsiung 7 Chiayi 2
Miaoli 2 Taoyuan 3 Taoyuan 4 Kaohsiung 9 Pingtung 1
Jilong Taoyuan 5 Taitung Ilan Pingtung 3
Hsinchu City Hsinchu Cnty Taoyuan 2
Jinmen Miaoli 1 Changhua 1
Lienchiang Changhua 2 Yunlin 1
Changhua 3 Chiayi 1
Changhua 4 Pingtung 2
Nantou 1 Chiayi City
Nantou 2
Hualien
Penghu

How did I do?

Safe blue: 14 of 14 correct (100%)

Leans blue: 18 of 20 (90%)

tossup: KMT 6, DPP 5

leans green: 9 of 17 correct (53%)

safe green: 11 of 11 (100%)

overall safe or leaning: 52 of 62 (84%)

I think I misclassified a few of the seats that I got right.  Taipei 4, Taoyuan 1, and Taoyuan 4 should have been blue leaning seats, not tossup seats.  In those districts, Tsai’s vote was not close to Ma’s.   Tainan 3 and Tainan 4 probably should have been listed as leaning green, not safe green.

What about the ten races I got wrong?  Well, in the leans green category, five of the eight losses were by razor thin margins (Taoyuan 2, Changhua 1, Yunlin 1, Chiayi 1, Pingtung 2).  If Tsai had lost by four points instead of six (or nine), the DPP would have won those five seats.  I’ll blame the nearly perfect split of green votes in Kaohsiung 9 on CSB’s mother-in-law’s untimely death.  The DPP should have won Taichung 8; its candidate was shockingly weak.

I have no excuse for New Taipei 5.  This one is in the wrong category.  In recent elections, Shulin has been a fairly good area for the DPP, but this time Tsai lost to Ma in Shulin by a clear margin.

The two misses in the leans blue category were highly surprising to me.  Ma won a majority in both districts, and the KMT had seemingly entrenched incumbents in both.  At least I can claim I had my eye on Penghu; Changhua 4 was completely unexpected to me.  Heck, the DPP candidate was a familiar old face, and I thought we could be sure that we knew what he was (not) capable of.   Every election has at least one completely inexplicable result, and this was it for me.

Overall, this wasn’t perfect, but it wasn’t bad considering I had no polling data to work with.

a new political cleavage?

January 15, 2012

I think when we look back at the 2012 election a decade from now, we might remember this as the year the economic cleavage was introduced to Taiwan’s politics.

This is the first year that big businesses have lined up so unanimously on one side.  Moreover, there was a real difference in Tsai’s vision of a welfare state with wealth distributed more evenly and Ma’s focus on the traditional numbers like GDP growth.

However, if this is the first time the election has been so explicitly framed in terms of a left-right divide, we must remind ourselves that this was not a cross-cutting cleavage.  Instead, the new left-right divide was simply layered on top of the China cleavage.  The big businesses lined up on the KMT’s side precisely because they want access to the China market.  Tsai framed her concern about the growing wealth gap in terms of how integration into the China market affects normal people’s incomes.

Maybe in the future, the left-right cleavage will take on a life of its own and cut across the traditional unification-independence axis.  If it does, that might upset the KMT’s seeming perpetual majority.  For now, I am simply observing the emergence of a left-right cleavage as an important way to decide which side you are on.

 


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