My-Formosa 美麗島電子報 has released its November poll. This is the first high quality poll to be released since the referendum campaigns began in earnest about a month ago. Earlier polls showed that all four items were favored to pass, but the DPP has been waging an energetic campaign to vote “no” on all four. This poll is the first solid evidence we have of the effectiveness of that campaign.
Before looking at the referendums, let’s first look at the general lay of the land. From a partisan perspective, this month’s poll is similar to or even slightly better for President Tsai and the DPP than the previous few months. Tsai’s favorability rating is currently +14.0% (55.8% satisfied, 41.8% dissatisfied). On party ID, 40.4% support a green party, 19.0% support a blue party, and 7.0% support the TPP. If you consider the TPP to actually be in the blue camp (and that increasingly seems to be a reasonable assumption), the numbers look a lot like those right around the January 2020 election. As you’ll recall, Tsai won that election by 19%. As far as I can tell, the electorate hasn’t changed very much since then. So that’s the underlying partisan structure.
With that out of the way, let’s get to the referendums. Here are the bottom-line numbers.
All respondents | yes | no | Yes – no |
R17: Restart 4NPP | 37.8 | 51.9 | -14.1 |
R18: Ban ractopamine pork | 55.4 | 37.9 | +17.5 |
R19: Referendums on same day | 46.1 | 41.7 | +4.4 |
R20: Move LNG / protect coral reef | 35.0 | 41.1 | -6.1 |
The two energy referendums (R17 and R20) are now showing more opposition than support, and this is particularly evident for R17. This probably has something to do with the KMT withdrawing its all-out support for these two items a month ago. The two items that the KMT explicitly sponsored are still in positive territory. The gap in R19 is positive, though it is smaller than it was in much earlier polls. The gap in R18, the pork referendum, is still a gaping 17.5%. At first glance, the DPP doesn’t seem to have made any headway there at all.
But wait. That might not be the entire story. We don’t know what turnout will be, but it certainly won’t be 100%. Only 62% of respondents said they would definitely turn out to vote. For reference, a month before the Jan 2020 election, 77% said they would definitely turn out. I’m skeptical we will get 62%, but mid- or high 50s seems plausible. At any rate, those 62% are a bit different from the 38% who aren’t so sure about voting.
Will Definitely Vote (62%) | yes | no | Yes – no |
R17: Restart 4NPP | 39.1 | 54.9 | -15.8 |
R18: Ban ractopamine pork | 51.0 | 44.6 | +6.4 |
R19: Referendums on same day | 47.2 | 46.5 | +0.7 |
R20: Move LNG / protect coral reef | 37.9 | 46.6 | -8.7 |
The two energy referendums are basically the same, but the two KMT referendums are much closer. R19 is now basically tied. R18 is still passing, but more than half of the margin has evaporated. If this is the right way to look at the polls, R18 is within shouting distance.
Let’s unpack these results a bit. One of the great things about the My-Formosa polls is that they give us lots of cross-tables, so that we can look at the results in a bit more detail.
Why does turnout matter so much? Green voters are more motivated to vote, and they are the biggest section of the electorate.[1] In the full sample, green voters make up 40% of the sample. When you adjust for turnout, they make up nearly half the voters.
Party ID | Will definitely vote | respondents | Group size | Adjusted group size |
Blue | 67.4 | 205 | 19.0 | 20.6 |
Green | 73.6 | 435 | 40.4 | 47.8 |
TPP | 67.2 | 75 | 7.0 | 7.5 |
neutral | 46.3 | 328 | 30.5 | 22.7 |
Ok, but are those green voters a disciplined, monolithic voting bloc? Actually, no. And neither are the blue voters. As for TPP supporters, they are pretty close to the KMT in every category. This isn’t just a matter of referendums; their answers to more partisan questions such as satisfaction with President Tsai also look a lot like those from blue supporters. There really isn’t much point in discussing them separately; mentally you can just lump them in with the blue voters.
R17 has the clearest partisan lines of the four items. Since Taiwanese have been fighting over the 4th Nuclear Power Plant for three decades and the fights were sharply defined along partisan lines early in Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, maybe this isn’t surprising. However, even here the two big camps aren’t monolithic. This is a more difficult topic for blue voters, and only 70% of them support this referendum.
R17: 4NPP | yes | no | other | Group size |
Blue | 69.3 | 21.8 | 8.9 | 19.0 |
TPP | 60.6 | 36.2 | 3.2 | 7.0 |
Green | 14.8 | 80.8 | 4.4 | 40.4 |
neutral | 44.1 | 36.8 | 19.1 | 30.5 |
All respondents | 37.8 | 51.9 | 10.3 | 100.0 |
The pork referendum is the mirror image of 4NPP. Here, the blue side is overwhelmingly in favor, and the green side is a little divided. One-fourth of green voters plan to vote against the DPP’s position. Given that they are trailing and still need to change some minds, this isn’t necessarily bad news for the DPP. The existence of a pool of voters who generally like and trust Tsai for the DPP to work on is a good thing. It should be a lot easier to appeal to those voters than to other groups. If they can persuade DPP sympathizers to turn out and vote for the DPP position, victory is not impossible. It is also stunning how lopsided the neutral voters are. These will be harder for Tsai and the DPP to persuade since they don’t necessarily trust the messengers. A higher turnout of this group would probably guarantee passage of the referendum.
R18: pork | yes | no | other | Group size |
Blue | 85.8 | 12.7 | 1.5 | 19.0 |
TPP | 78.2 | 20.4 | 1.4 | 7.0 |
Green | 26.6 | 69.2 | 4.2 | 40.4 |
neutral | 67.3 | 19.3 | 13.4 | 30.5 |
All respondents | 55.1 | 37.9 | 7.0 | 100.0 |
R19 has even more muddled partisan lines. For the blue camp, this probably reflects longstanding skepticism toward referendums and the memory of the chaotic 2018 elections. For the green camp, it is probably due to decades of arguing for the establishment of referendums and then for more permissive rules.
R19: same day | yes | no | other | Group size |
Blue | 65.8 | 26.1 | 8.1 | 19.0 |
TPP | 64.3 | 33.1 | 2.6 | 7.0 |
Green | 32.3 | 58.5 | 9.2 | 40.4 |
neutral | 47.0 | 32.7 | 20.3 | 30.5 |
All respondents | 46.1 | 41.7 | 12.2 | 100.0 |
R20 is the most opaque. Both camps are internally divided. More than that, voters seem to be more unsure about this referendum than the others. Nearly one-fourth of respondents did not express a preference on R20. This is a technically difficult question, and, unlike the others, voters haven’t been discussing this topic for years and years. There will be a lot of voters who turn out to vote for the other three items and then, by the way, also cast an unsure vote on R20, and those voters could well decide whether this referendum passes or fails.
R20: LNT / coral reef | yes | no | other | Group size |
Blue | 54.7 | 26.5 | 18.8 | 19.0 |
TPP | 63.5 | 27.6 | 8.9 | 7.0 |
Green | 19.6 | 64.5 | 15.9 | 40.4 |
neutral | 36.9 | 23.2 | 39.9 | 30.5 |
All respondents | 35.0 | 41.1 | 23.9 | 100.0 |
I had expected that support for the two energy-related items would look similar, but I was dead wrong. This table shows the percentage of the electorate in each box (so if you add them horizontally or vertically you will get the subtotal). I expected people to vote yes on both or no on both, but the poll shows a much more complex picture. About 10% of all respondents chose yes-no, and about the same number chose no-yes. And there are a lot more who are still unsure. Clearly, large parts of the electorate do not think of these two measures as being closely related.
R20 | LNG, reef | ||||
yes | no | other | all | ||
Yes | 21.2 | 9.0 | 7.6 | 37.8 | |
R17 | No | 12.1 | 31.4 | 8.4 | 51.9 |
4NPP | Other | 1.8 | 0.7 | 7.9 | 10.4 |
All | 35.0 | 41.1 | 23.9 | 100.0 |
Finally, let’s look at some demographic differences. There aren’t a lot of dramatic patterns, and many of the differences can be explained by partisanship.
On gender, it is useful to remember that men generally support the DPP a bit more than women. For example, President Tsai’s satisfaction rating is 5.6% lower among women than men.
On three of the four items, there is not much of a gender gap. For example, women are against R17 by a 14.5% margin while men are against it by a 13.5% margin. That’s not much of a difference. However, there is a gaping gender gap on the pork referendum, where women support it by 28.1% but men only support it by 6.6%. If R18 passes, it will be driven by women.
The other thing to note is how many more women are unsure. On R20, 84.1% of men expressed a preference while only 68.8% of women did. If you stare at the numbers long enough, you can almost hear the mansplaining.
R17 | 4NPP | R18 | pork | R19 | same day | R20 | LNG, reef | ||
yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | ||
Women | 34.7 | 49.2 | 59.6 | 31.5 | 44.8 | 39.3 | 32.2 | 36.2 | |
Men | 41.1 | 54.6 | 51.1 | 44.5 | 47.4 | 44.1 | 38.0 | 46.1 | |
Gender gap | -1.0 | 21.5 | 2.2 | 4.1 | |||||
There aren’t a lot of geographic differences, and most of those are probably related to partisanship. However, I will note that support for R20 is highest in Taoyuan-Hsinchu-Miaoli (+9.6% locally; -6.1% nationally). Cynically, I suspect that they are more interested in blocking construction of a local power plant than saving their local coral reef.
I’m also not seeing a lot of dramatic patterns in age and education. Perhaps the most interesting deals with education and R20. Recall that R20 was the most confusing item. There isn’t a lot of difference in the “no” vote, but there are enormous differences in “yes.” I’m not sure how to interpret this, but it is striking. R17 and R19 show similar patterns, but they are not quite as extreme. R18, the pork referendum, is the outlier. In that one, there is a U-shaped pattern, with support for R18 lowest in the primary or less group, highest in the high school group, and just about at the national average in the university and up group.
R20 | LNG, reef | Size of group | |
yes | no | ||
Primary or less | 11.8 | 42.5 | 12.0% |
Junior high | 28.3 | 46.3 | 11.8% |
High school | 34.4 | 38.9 | 27.6% |
Technical college | 46.6 | 34.8 | 11.6% |
University and up | 41.4 | 42.6 | 36.9% |
Many of these patterns are probably insignificant or even ephemeral. There are only two that I’m fairly confident about. There are clear partisan patterns, and there is a clear gender gap on the pork referendum.
Right now, the pork referendum is the most likely to pass, and the 4NPP referendum is most likely to fail. However, there are clear indications in this data of how the DPP might defeat the pork referendum, which is after all far and away the most important of these. In a nutshell, they need to convince their supporters to support them. If they can persuade voters who already prefer to the DPP to vote overwhelmingly against the pork referendum, they have a realistic path to victory. It’s a heavy lift, but there is a path.
[1] There isn’t much to learn about the New Power Party (1.1% support), Taiwan Statebuilding Party (2.2%), or People First Party (0.2%) from this poll. They just don’t have enough support to fruitfully analyze. The overwhelming majority of the blue (green) voters support the KMT (DPP). Both camps also have about 5% who don’t mention any specific party but place themselves in that camp. Generally speaking, all the trends are a bit sharper if you look specifically at KMT and DPP support, but I prefer simplifying things into four big groups. I’m also ignoring the 3.1% of the sample that didn’t give a valid response to the party ID question since they are very small and the least likely to turn out.