I know all of you have been waiting breathlessly for a neatly organized spreadsheet of the presidential and legislative elections broken down by legislative districts, so here it is! Start analyzing, and let me know if you find anything interesting.
While I’m waiting for the Central Election Commission to release the full election results in Excel form (as opposed to having to cut and paste each results from each town or polling station into my own spreadsheet), let’s take a break from analyzing election results. Instead, today’s topic is whether Tsai Ing-wen should agree to form a caretaker government.
I think it is an awful idea. I think Tsai is handling the situation perfectly by refusing to form a caretaker cabinet, proposing a bill to govern the transition of power during the lame duck period, and insisting that appointing the cabinet is still the president’s prerogative. However, there seems to be a growing call for her to take over immediately. Let me explain why I think this is a bad idea.
This problem should be considered from two angles: legal and political. From a legal perspective, the constitution sets out a four year fixed presidential term. There is no mention of a caretaker government, and the president’s formal powers are not diminished during the period between the election and the inauguration of the next president. Many people will argue that there is a new expression of public opinion that has removed the president’s mandate. However, mandates are ambiguous. It is impossible to know exactly what message, if any, the electorate collectively intended to send. Thus, constitutions make no mention of mandates. Legally, we need only be concerned that a majority in the legislature will have significantly different preferences than the president. This tension is played out in the struggle for the control of the cabinet, where most of the concrete government policies are determined.
The cabinet is appointed by the president. (Technically, only the premier is appointed by the president, and the premier then appoints the rest of the cabinet. In practice, the president determines the makeup of the entire cabinet.) Many people have pointed to the French model of cohabitation and suggested that the cabinet should be responsible to the legislative majority. However, there is a critical distinction between the French semi-presidential system and the Taiwanese semi-presidential system. In France, the president nominates the premier, who must be confirmed by the legislature. In Taiwan, the president appoints the premier, and no confirmation vote is necessary. This difference fundamentally changes the relationship between the executive and the legislature. In France, the legislative majority always forms the cabinet. In Taiwan’s only previous period of divided government, from 2000 to 2008, the legislative majority never formed the cabinet. The same pattern happens again and again in countries all over the world.
In Taiwan, the constitution gives the legislature the right to vote no confidence in the premier. If this happens, the premier resigns, and the president simply appoints a new premier. (The president could dissolve the legislature and call for new elections, but that is almost unthinkable during a lame duck period following a decisive electoral result.) The constitution thus empowers the president to appoint a cabinet that will implement his favored policies, so long as those actions are not so clearly against the preferences of the legislative majority that the legislative majority is moved to use its nuclear option. In the current situation, the legislative majority will not allow the cabinet very much freedom of action, so the cabinet will be constrained mostly to routine business. If the cabinet tries to make on any controversial or important decision, such as applying to join the AIIB, negotiating a Trade in Goods agreement with China, or approving the takeover of a Taiwanese high tech company by a Chinese company, the legislature can simply vote no-confidence and block the move.
Some people are calling for President Ma and Vice President Wu to appoint Tsai as Premier and then resign. Since the premier takes over the presidency if both the presidency and vice presidency are vacated, this would lead to Tsai taking office as president four months early. This is a terrible solution. Systems in which orderly transitions of power cannot be handled through routine procedures are systems with weak constitutional orders. When a president steps down early, this is always a clear signal to the rest of the world of a country in crisis and democratic system on the brink of collapse. That is not the signal that Taiwan wants to send out.
Tsai also has to think about a possible second term in which she might not have a legislative majority. She probably doesn’t want to weaken the presidency.
If the four month lame duck period is indeed problematic, Taiwan should handle it calmly and carefully. After considering the lessons of this year’s experience, Taiwan should put together a comprehensive reform package to institutionalize smooth power transitions. This might involve constitutional reform, so it will need a high degree of consensus.
That’s enough legal stuff. The political arguments are much more interesting. To put it bluntly, these calls for Tsai to take power immediately are a trap.
Tsai is not ready to take power. She has spent the past few months campaigning, not preparing for office. These are very different purposes. She needs a month or two to put together her governing team, plan out her concrete agenda, listen to detailed briefings from government agencies so she can get up to speed on specific policy questions, and engage in unofficial diplomacy with the USA, China, Japan, and others. She could probably also use a little rest.
Once Tsai takes power, there will be public expectations for her to govern. If she appoints an interim cabinet, even if she is not the premier, the public will expect it to immediately start implementing her agenda. However, she won’t have complete power yet. President Ma will still control important levers of power, and her team won’t be able to completely dominate the political arena. Imagine if she sends a team to negotiate with China and President Ma undermines the mission by screaming loudly that the DPP should respect the 92 Consensus (a position that he reiterated today). Or imagine that Ma uses the intelligence networks to leak information that might undermine a policy proposal. The interim cabinet might be dragged down in nasty fights, and Ma manages to block things it might look ineffective. Tsai’s popularity and mandate will slowly be eroded away. By the time she takes office, she might not have any honeymoon period left.
She is much better off simply waiting on the sidelines and letting the Ma government take responsibility for a period of relative inaction. If pressure builds up for her to act forcefully and dynamically when she takes office, Great! She can prepare a broad agenda, have everything ready to go on Day 1, and take power in a whirlwind of energy and action. This will allow her to make maximum use of her honeymoon period, and it might even extend that period.
[In American politics, all presidents are judged by their first hundred days. This is because President Roosevelt pushed through a slew of fundamental reform legislation during his first hundred days in 1933. These legislative acts formed the core of the New Deal, which fundamentally transformed the nature of American government. What most people don’t remember is that Roosevelt also had a four month lame duck period, and during the winter of 1933 the American economy sank into a deeper and deeper depression. Roosevelt ignored calls to take office early and waited calmly as public pressure for action mounted. When he took office, he was able to use that pressure to push through his agenda. By not grabbing at power, he was ultimately able to achieve far more of his political program.]
One of the things on Tsai’s agenda is constitutional reform. She wants to change the electoral system and lower the voting age. If the transition period turns out to be rough, this will provide added pressure for constitutional changes in order to rectify legislative and presidential terms. She might be able to work all her proposals together into a single package that would have a better chance of passing. In other words, a messy transition in the short term could be useful as a way of achieving the constitutional reform necessary to produce a better political system for the long term.
I think the KMT (and it is mostly blue voices clamoring for her to take power immediately) is trying to tempt Tsai into a political trap by enticing her with immediate power. If she is a ruthless, calculating, determined idealistic politician who wants to fundamentally transform Taiwan, she will continue to resist these calls.
Perhaps one of the biggest surprises of election night was that the DPP won the legislative district seats in both Taitung and Hualien. Moreover, this happened even though those two (and the two Fujian counties) were the only places in which the KMT beat the DPP in the presidential race. Perhaps some people thought that Taitung wasn’t a surprise since the DPP already held that seat, but let’s remember that they won that seat in 2012 with only 41.6% of the vote, taking advantage of a split in the KMT. This time, both Liu Chao-hao 劉櫂豪 in Taitung and Bi-khim Hsiao 蕭美琴 in Hualien won convincing majorities (64.2% and 53.4%, respectively). How did they do this?
There is an obvious possibility. In both Taitung and Hualien, indigenous voters account for about a third of the electorate. While the DPP has made some inroads with this group, indigenous voters still overwhelmingly support the KMT. Since indigenous voters cast their legislative votes in indigenous districts rather than in the regular geographical district, it stands to reason that the electorates in the Taitung and Hualien legislative districts should be quite a bit greener than the electorates in those counties in the presidential race. Is that difference sufficient to explain Liu and Hsiao’s victories?
Let’s examine the party list votes. As in previous posts, I combine the votes of all the green parties, the blue parties, and the others.
Party lists are like the presidential votes; they include indigenous voters. Perhaps not surprisingly, Tsai got 38.4% and 36.9% in the two counties, running about 2-3% ahead of the green party list vote just as she did in the rest of the country.
Now let’s look at the vote in the indigenous districts:
In both counties, the DPP got about 14% of the indigenous district vote, while the KMT candidates got about 65%. However, that leaves another 20% voting for other candidates. On the party list, only about 7% voted for non-blue and non-green parties. I’m going to make a few big assumptions here. First, I assume that people who voted for the DPP in the indigenous district also voted for a green list. Likewise, I assume that KMT indigenous votes indicate blue list votes. Second, I assume that indigenous voters voted for one of the non-blue and non-green party lists at about the same rate as non-indigenous voters. This means that I have to reassign some of the votes in the third column to the first two columns. Since this is sloppy, I eyeballed it and shifted 4860 votes in Taitung (leaving an even 2000 in the “other” column) and 4000 votes in Hualien (leaving 2309). Third, I’m going to assume that 90% of these shifted votes went to a blue list and 10% went to a green list. I don’t really have any defense for these proportions other than to say they sound reasonable to me. If they don’t sound reasonable to you, remember that we are talking about relatively small numbers. If you assume it is 80-20, that only changes the final numbers by about 800 votes.
Here are the adjusted indigenous votes. Remember, these are my estimates, not actual results:
From here, it is a relatively straightforward job to subtract these numbers from those in the first table to get the estimated party list votes for the non-indigenous electorate. These should be the voters that Liu and Hsiao were competing for.
As a reminder, here are the actual district results:
As you can see, both Liu and Hsiao outperformed the party lists by quite a lot. Eliminating the indigenous votes does not explain the results. Taitung should have been a toss-up (which is a stunning finding in and of itself), while Hualien should still have been a fairly safe KMT seat. In reality, both were lopsided DPP wins.
So if indigenous voters are not the answer, what is? The green-leaning media has fallen in love with the story that Hsiao has won over a skeptical Hualien population with her years of hard work. Supposedly, they never expected to see her again after her good showing in the 2010 by-election, but she kept coming back. Moved by her sincerity, they fell in love with her. Well, I suppose there must be some truth to that story, but a lot of candidates have spent a lot of time working local districts only to be disappointed on election day. Maybe I’m too cynical, but I suspect this story makes for a better movie script than a convincing accounting of her victory.
My guess is that these two elections turned on local factional machinations. In Hualien, there has been a constant tension over the past decade between the local KMT machinery, led by outgoing legislator Wang Ting-sheng 王廷升, and the Fu faction, which is led by county magistrate Fu Kun-chi 傅崑萁. These two have repeatedly tried to undermine the other over the past several years, and I suspect Fu might have clandestinely done it again. The KMT was worried enough about this possibility that they put Fu’s wife on the party list. I had thought that this bribe would be sufficient to convince Fu to mobilize his supporters to vote for Wang, but maybe it wasn’t. The civil war in the Hualien blue camp doesn’t get a lot of headlines in the national press, but I’ll bet there are some angry accusations flying around.
In Taitung, the factional story is even more plausible. Remember, Liu has a history of cooperating with factions on the blue side. He was the deputy magistrate from 2001 to 2005 for Hsu Ching-yuan 徐慶元, who was elected as a PFP nominee. Apparently, this local PFP-DPP collaboration went very well. In 2005, Hsu did not run for re-election. Instead he supported Liu’s unsuccessful campaign to succeed him. It would not be surprising at all to me if Liu has been nurturing all those contacts for the last decade. Perhaps his blue friends weren’t willing to openly help Liu in his county magistrate campaigns against the popular Justin Huang 黃健庭, but they might have been willing to do so against the relatively unknown KMT nominee this year.
In sum, I only have a speculative explanation for these two victories. I can, however, rule out the possibility that Hualien and Taitung have already turned decisively green, once you remove the indigenous vote. Both Hsiao and Liu somehow managed to win over a large chunk of blue voters.
Let’s consider the case of Hau Lung-bin. Two weeks ago, Hau seemed pretty well positioned to take over leadership of the KMT. All the other potential contenders were old (Wang, Hung, Wu, Hu), unpopular with the general electorate (Wu, Hung), unacceptable to a crucial faction within the KMT (Wang), had just been discredited by a terrible election loss in 2014 (Hu, Wu Chih-yang, Lien), or had proven to be a terrible leader as was about to suffer a humiliating election defeat (Chu). Hau was going to be the last man standing. He didn’t lose in 2014, and he was acceptable to the powerful mainlander faction in the KMT while still being perceived as more moderate than Hung. All he had to do was prove his electoral viability by winning his legislative race in Keelung, a city that had always been reliably blue until 2014.
Let’s remember that Hau originally indicated that he was going to go to southern or central Taiwan to win a difficult seat for the KMT. I even wrote a post looking at his options. In hindsight, they all look ridiculous. The DPP won all of the other possibilities by huge margins, and Hau would almost certainly have been slaughtered in any of them. Instead, Hau decided that the cautious approach was the wisest. He probably could see the DPP’s wave coming and cynically decided to save himself by choosing the one winnable race. After he muscled the locals aside, his road to the legislature and leadership of the KMT seemed to be on track.
Instead, Hau lost. Perhaps the important point isn’t merely that he lost, but just how badly he lost. He didn’t lose because there weren’t enough blue votes. He didn’t lose because the DPP nominated a spectacular candidate. He lost because blue voters didn’t vote for him. In a city that still has more blue voters than green voters, Hau could only manage to win 36.1% of the vote. This election was supposed to prove Hau’s popularity with the general public and solidify his position as the only KMT leader who could win elections in a difficult year. Instead, the Keelung electorate collectively decided to veto Hau’s aspirations to take over the KMT.
Hau’s basic problem was that he was unable to consolidate the blue vote. There were two other blue candidates in the race. Liu Wen-hsiung is an old PFP warhorse, and Yang Shi-cheng is a city councilor who lost to Hau in the KMT primary and ran under the MKT banner. The fact that they were in the race is insufficient to explain Hau’s loss; a strong KMT candidate would have easily marginalized these two candidates and consolidated almost all of the blue vote.
Duverger’s Law says that single seat plurality elections tend to produce two main contenders. One reason is that voters simply won’t waste their votes on trailing candidates. Why did nearly a quarter of Keelung’s electorate vote for the two minor candidates? There are several possible reasons. One, voters must be able to identify who are the leading and who are the trailing candidates. This probably wasn’t a problem. All the media focus focused on Hau and the DPP’s Tsai, and the few publicly available opinion polls also showed them to be well ahead. Besides, years of experience (including last year’s Keelung mayoral race) have shown that the KMT and DPP nominees are almost always the top two candidates. In short, many voters chose to support Yang or Liu even though they knew those two were unlikely to win. Second, the race between the top two candidates must be close enough for strategic voting to make a difference. All indications were that Hau and Tsai were in a close race, so this should have driven Liu and Yang supporters to abandon their favorites in an effort to help determine the outcome of the race. Third, potential strategic voters must have a clear preference between the top two choices. This might be a more likely culprit. Several recent surveys have shown that PFP identifiers (unsurprisingly) don’t like the DPP. More surprisingly, their evaluations of the KMT are roughly as low as those for the DPP. In other words, many PFP supporters don’t clearly prefer the KMT to the DPP. Hau’s status as an outsider who parachuted in from Taipei may also have hurt him, especially among people who voted for Yang. Yang represented the localist faction of the KMT, and his supporters might disliked the outsider Hau just as much as they disliked the DPP’s Tsai. Fourth, most models assume that strategic voters are short-term rational. This means that they care only about the outcome of this election. However, some voters might choose to vote for a hopeless candidate precisely because they care more about some long-term goal. For example, PFP or MKT supporters might have voted for Liu or Yang because they cared about the long-term health of the PFP or MKT. More intriguingly, I wonder if some light-blue voters didn’t look to the impending KMT leadership struggle and decide that the best way to support a nativist KMT leader was to vote against Hau in the legislative race.
Let’s look at some votes. The following table shows the party list votes aggregated into green camp (DPP, NPP, TSU, Free Taiwan, Taiwan Independence), blue camp (KMT, PFP, MKT, New, MCFAP, China Unification), and others. It also shows the four candidate’s votes:
On the party lists, there were about 4,500 more blue votes than green votes. (This might be a bit misleading since it includes about 3,500 indigenous voters who didn’t vote in the district election. The DPP only got about 500 of those votes, so the overall blue advantage in the legislative district was probably closer to 2,000 votes. I’m going to ignore the indigenous vote for the rest of the post.) However, Tsai was not able to soak up all the green votes. Nearly 9,000 green list voters split their tickets and voted for a blue district candidate. Given this, the race should have been winnable for Hau.
Some people like thinking in numbers of votes, but I think it is often easier to think in vote shares.
Hau ran 11.9% behind the blue list vote. This gap was similar everywhere except Zhongshan District, where he ran 16.9% behind the list. Tsai ran 4.3% behind the green list vote. He also did worse in Zhongshan, where he was 9.2% behind. However, he did better in Anle, where he was only 1.4% behind. If you guessed that Tsai’s city council district is Anle, you guessed correctly.
Let’s look at the other two candidates. This time we’ll compare their votes with their party’s list share.
Keelung is one of the PFP’s stronger areas, as its list garnered 9.2% here compared to 6.5% nationally. Like in the rest of the country, Soong got roughly twice as many presidential votes (16.5%) as the PFP list. Liu Wen-hsiung split the difference, getting 12.4% of the vote. Liu’s vote thus looks like it is mostly a party vote rather than a personal vote. These PFP voters might be part of the blue camp when it comes to national identity, but they seem fed up with the KMT. Many of them didn’t give any of their three votes to the KMT, something the new KMT leadership should probably reflect upon.
Finally, we come to Yang Shi-cheng and the MKT. Unlike the other parties, the MKT doesn’t really have much of a presence. Its party list only got 2.0% in Keelung, and Yang’s vote seems to be rather unrelated to the MKT support. I imagine most people who voted for the MKT list probably also voted for Yang, but the vast majority of his votes came from other sources. You have probably guessed by now that Zhongshan is Yang’s city council district, and he got more than twice as much support in Zhongshan as in the rest of the city. Since each of the other three candidates’ vote shares suffered in Zhongshan, it stands to reason that Yang’s local networks extended into KMT, DPP, and PFP vote bases alike. In the rest of the city, I think that Yang’s vote probably reflects the localist backlash against Hau. We saw a similar backlash in the 2014 mayoral election. The KMT can probably win these votes back, but only if they stop nominating outsiders from Taipei.
Hau lost the race by 5.4%. He probably could have won the race if he had been able to make an alliance with the localist faction represented by Yang. However, this is precisely the part of the former KMT coalition that is furious with the mainlander KMT elite for their treatment of Speaker Wang and their efforts to promote ideological purists such as Hung Hsiu-chu. There were some districts in which these voters stayed with the KMT, especially in central Taiwan. However, the nominees in those districts were almost all from the nativist wing of the KMT. Hau is decidedly not from that wing.
In the wake of the election, several KMT pundits have attempted to downplay the KMT’s defeat by pointing to low turnout, the K-pop singer incident, and the splintering of the blue camp vote by other parties. All the KMT needs to do, they suggest, is simply to consolidate the blue vote. Keelung’s experience suggests there is nothing simple about it. A localist candidate might have won, but that would have required Hau to put his leadership ambitions aside. More generally, the orthodox wing of the KMT seems unwilling to put aside or water down its ideological positions or to yield leadership of the party to the nativist wing. Absent those sorts of compromises, the KMT might be headed for a future with many more races like Keelung.
A lot of KMT incumbents lost last Saturday, and many of them were quite senior. I thought I’d add up all the seniority that the KMT lost in the massacre. For example, Lee Ching-hua, who lost in New Taipei 12, was first elected in 1992 and has served seven terms. There were nineteen such losers in the 73 district races:
|丁守中||Ting Shou-chung||Taipei 1||7|
|林郁方||Lin Yu-fang||Taipei 5||5|
|吳育昇||Wu Yu-sheng||New Taipei 1||3|
|黃志雄||Huang Chih-hsiung||New Taipei 5||2|
|江惠貞||Chiang Hui-chen||New Taipei 7||1|
|張慶忠||Chang Ching-chung||New Taipei 8||3|
|盧嘉辰||Lu Chia-chen||New Taipei 10||2|
|李慶華||Lee Ching-hua||New Taipei 12||7|
|陳根德||Chen Ken-te||Taoyuan 1||5|
|廖正井||Liao Cheng-ching||Taoyuan 2||2|
|楊麗環||Yang Li-huan||Taoyuan 4||4|
|孫大千||Sun Ta-chien||Taoyuan 6||4|
|楊瓊瓔||Yang Chiung-ying||Taichung 3||5|
|蔡錦隆||Tsai Chin-lung||Taichung 4||3|
|林國正||Lin Kuo-cheng||Kaohsiung 9||1|
|林滄敏||Lin Tsang-min||Changhua 2||3|
|鄭汝芬||Cheng Ju-fen||Changhua 3||2|
|王進士||Wang Chin-shih||Pingtung 2||2|
That’s 19 KMT incumbents who ran for re-election but lost on Saturday. They collectively had 68 terms of seniority. But wait, there’s more. There were several KMT district legislators who did not make it to the ballot. Some of them lost in the primary, and some of them voluntarily retired. However, in political science we tend to look at “voluntary” retirements somewhat skeptically. Often the person would like to continue in office, but he or she makes a judgment that re-election is quite unlikely and chooses to “retire.” So I’m going to list all the KMT district incumbents who didn’t make it to the final ballot.
|羅淑蕾||Lo Shu-lei||Taipei 3||*||3|
|蔡正元||Alex Tsai||Taipei 4||*||4|
|林鴻池||Lin Hung-chih||New Taipei 6||3|
|徐欣瑩||Hsu Hsin-ying||Hsinchu County||*||1|
|張嘉郡||Chang Chia-chun||Yunlin 1||2|
|翁重鈞||Weng Chung-chun||Chiayi 1||7|
|呂學樟||Lu Hsueh-chang||Hsinchu City||4|
* KMT held the seat with a different candidate.
Nine KMT district incumbents didn’t make it to the final ballot. They collectively had 28 terms of seniority. However, this is a little misleading. The KMT held onto three of the nine seats. In fact, Hsu Hsin-ying had already defected from the KMT to form the MKT, so maybe we should consider the KMT to have regained the Hsinchu County seat. Anyway, the six KMT districts who retired and whose seats were taken by the DPP had a collective 20 terms of seniority.
[Maybe I should mention Hau Lung-bin, who wasn’t an incumbent legislator but did serve two terms back in the 1990s.]
If you are counting at home, that makes 25 KMT district incumbents whose seats were taken by the green side. Those 25 KMT legislators had a total of 83 terms under their belts, or an average of 3.3 terms each. That adds up to roughly 300 years of seniority. To put that in perspective, the 24 KMT candidates who won district or indigenous seats only have a total of 48 terms.
|蔣萬安||Chiang Wan-an||Taipei 3||0|
|李彥秀||Lee Yan-hsiu||Taipei 4||0|
|蔣乃辛||Chiang Nai-hsin||Taipei 6||2|
|費鴻泰||Alex Fai||Taipei 7||3|
|賴士葆||Lai Shih-bao||Taipei 8||4|
|林德福||Lin Teh-fu||New Taipei 9||4|
|羅明才||Luo Ming-tsai||New Taipei 11||5|
|陳學聖||Apollo Chen||Taoyuan 3||3|
|呂玉玲||Lu Yu-ling||Taoyuan 5||1|
|顏寬恒||Yen Kuan-heng||Taichung 2||1|
|盧秀燕||Lu Hsiu-yen||Taichung 5||5|
|江啟臣||Chiang Chi-chen||Taichung 8||1|
|林為洲||Lin Wei-chou||Hsinchu County||1|
|陳超明||Chen Chao-ming||Miaoli 1||2|
|徐志榮||Hsu Chih-jung||Miaoli 2||1|
|王惠美||Wang Hui-mei||Changhua 1||1|
|馬文君||Ma Wen-chun||Nantou 1||2|
|許淑華||Hsu Shu-hua||Nantou 2||1|
|孔文吉||Kung Wen-chi||Highland Indigenous||3|
With all that experience wiped away, the next KMT caucus is going to have a very different set of internal dynamics.
One of the DPP’s more controversial campaign decisions this year was to form alliances with various “progressive” parties and politicians in legislative races. The DPP did not nominate its own candidate in 11 of the 73 legislative district races. Instead, it supported a hodgepodge of 3 New Power Party, 1 TSU, 1 PFP, 1 Green/Social Democrat, and 5 independent candidates. All of these were nominated in what the DPP formally designated as “difficult” districts, so it seemed unlikely that the DPP could win any of them on its own. Instead, the DPP (probably Tsai) decided to follow last year’s successful Ko P model, cooperating with a candidate who might have some appeal across party lines.
How did this turn out? The NPP won all three of its races, and an independent candidate in Taoyuan 6 also won. It’s hard to fault any strategy that produced 4 victories in 11 seemingly impossible races, right?
Hold on there, hoss. If you’ve been reading this blog for any length of time, you probably know what’s coming. I think the cooperation strategy was actually not very successful at all. I think the DPP could have won all three districts that the NPP ran in, and it might have won two or three others. In other words, their alliance strategy may have cost them seats.
The DPP’s definition of a difficult district was always too restrictive. They designated 29 districts as “difficult” since their legislative candidates had won less than 42.5% in 2012. Given the DPP’s difficulties in indigenous districts, they needed to win at least 40 of the 73 districts. By designating 29 as difficult, they were considering 44 as clearly winnable. In hindsight, that seems laughable now. It should have been clearly wrong then too, since the DPP did quite well in the presidential and party list votes in some of the districts. At any rate, the 11 districts that they eventually yielded were chosen from these 29 difficult districts.
As we all know now, there has been a major swing in partisan patterns over the past four years. Districts that seemed close four years ago were landslides this time. Districts that were solidly blue last time were close or even flipped green this time. If the DPP’s allied candidates won five seats, was it because of their personal attractions, or were there simply enough green votes to go around this time?
My strategy for this analysis is to look at the party list votes. There were 18 parties. I classify five of them as green parties (DPP, NPP, TSU, Free Taiwan, Taiwan Independence), six of them as blue (KMT, MKT, PFP, New, MCFAP, Chinese Unification) and seven as unclear. The smaller parties were not formally allied with the camps, but I’ll assume that diehard independence (unification) voters would usually vote for the green (blue) camp candidate if forced to choose. It isn’t very many votes, so classifying the tiny parties doesn’t really affect things very much anyway. The most important unclear parties are the Green/SDP, Trees, and Faith and Hope Alliance. I’ll assume that, if forced to choose in a blue vs green legislative race, these voters would either abstain, vote for a minor party, or split their votes fairly evenly. (Green/SDP and Trees would probably tend to support the green side, while Faith and Hope would probably support the blue side.) To put it another way, we can probably simply ignore the unclear parties and concentrate on the blue and green camp votes.
Let’s look at Taipei City first. Unfortunately, the CEC aggregates party list votes up to the administrative district, and six of the eight electoral districts cross administrative lines. Still, these numbers are revealing.
|list||List||List %||List %|
Taipei 1, where DPP city councilor Wu Su-yao beat seven-term KMT incumbent Ting Shou-chung, includes Beitou and a small portion of Shilin. Many people have talked about this result as an upset, but it is clear from the party vote that the green camp has a solid majority in this district. Wu simply consolidated the green vote and won easily. Taipei 2 (Datong and most of Shilin) was already a DPP district, so we’ll ignore it.
Taipei 5 (Wanhua and most of Zhongzheng) was Freddy Lim’s district. Many people, including me, thought that this should be considered a blue-leaning district, but the party vote shows us wrong. The green side had a significant advantage in Wanhua and was almost even in Zhongzheng. Freddy didn’t win because Lin Yu-fang self-destructed. Freddy won because the national partisan patterns shifted, and he was running in a majority green district.
Taipei 6 is Da-an. The DPP yielded this district to Fan Yun, of the SDP. She lost to the KMT candidate by a 46-35% margin. According to the party list votes, this district is about a 49-42 blue camp advantage. Fan Yun not only didn’t bring any extra votes to the table, she wasn’t even able to soak up all the available green camp votes. The DPP probably wouldn’t have won this race with a DPP candidate, but it might have been closer.
In Taipei 7 (Xinyi plus a bit of Songshan) and Taipei 8 (Wenshan plus a bit of Zhongshan), the DPP allied with two independents who until 2014 were deep blue KMT city councilors. Yang Shi-chiu in Taipei 7 surprised many people by coming within a few thousand votes of winning, a result that seemed to justify the collaboration. However, a look at the party list votes shows that, once again, it was the new national partisan balance that was doing much of the hard work. It must be pointed out that Yang’s vote was not simply the green vote. There were over 17,000 votes cast for the Green/SDP candidate, while the Green/SDP list only got about 5,000-6,000 votes. Many of these extra votes were probably from green camp supporters who could not stomach voting for an old deep blue politician such as Yang, regardless of the DPP’s recommendation. Yang may have brought a few votes with him from the blue side, but since the final margin looks like the difference in the party list vote, it appears that for every vote Yang brought over from the blue side, there were two green voters who couldn’t bring themselves to vote for him. The same sort of thing seems to have happened in Taipei 8, where the Green/SDP candidate got over 22,000 votes (but their list was under 10,000). In Taipei 8, the partisan balance was probably not close enough that the DPP could have won, but it might have had a chance in Taipei 7 if everything had gone just right. At the very least, those 30,000 or so green camp sympathizers who cast a protest vote for the Green/SDP would have been much happier at the voting booth, and that should count for something.
This leaves Taipei 3 and 4, the two really interesting districts. Taipei 3 (Zhongshan and two-thirds of Songshan) is very similar to Taipei 5 in partisan balance. In the past it has had a clear blue camp advantage, but this year the party list votes say it should have been a green district. The DPP originally nominated a candidate who would have been a strong contender to knock of the KMT imperial prince, Chiang Wan-an. Instead, the green camp support was split between a controversial doctor and a Green/SDP candidate. The cooperation strategy very probably cost the DPP this seat and launched the political career of a possible KMT star. Bad, bad mistake.
In Taipei 4 (Nangang and Neihu), the DPP supported PFP city councilor Huang Shan-shan. Huang came within 4,000 votes of winning, so it looks like the strategy almost paid off. The primary reason it failed was that a lot of – perhaps 30,000 – green camp voters simply couldn’t stomach voting for a PFP politician and voted for the TSU, NPP, or Green/SDP candidates. However, a look at the party list votes suggests that a straight KMT/DPP race would have been a tossup, or perhaps even favor the DPP. If Huang had run in a KMT/DPP/PFP race (as seemed likely), the DPP would have had a decisive advantage. They had a perfectly capable candidate who was eager to run, but DPP party leaders decided not to nominate her. The cooperation strategy probably cost the DPP this seat. It also pissed off a lot of loyal green camp voters, which is not a great party-building strategy.
These party list figures also call into question the effectiveness of the so-called “Ko P” strategy. Unlike most people, I’ve always assumed that Ko Wen-je’s personal appeal had very little to do with winning the 2014 mayor race. I have always thought that Sean Lien’s ability to drive away blue camp voters was the most important factor in Ko’s victory and that, if the KMT had nominated a relatively uncontroversial candidate such as Ting Shou-chung, it would have easily defeated Ko. Now I’m not so sure. These party list numbers suggest that the green side has an advantage in Taipei City. It isn’t big, but in a straight blue/green fight, the green side has a better chance of winning. In other words, the effect of Ko’s personal appeal and/or Lien’s negative personal appeal may have been simply to turn a narrow Ko victory into a Ko landslide.
|list||List||List %||List %||Dist||Dist|
New Taipei has apparently become a solidly green city. (I am of the opinion that Eric Chu’s win in 2014 was a tremendous personal achievement, but, because the halo around him has faded so badly, there is no way he would win again if the mayoral election were held today.) Eight of the twelve electoral districts in New Taipei cross administrative lines. I am showing the four that do not plus two very interesting ones (D8 and D9).
D1, D10, and D11 all ended up being simple KMT vs DPP races. In all three, the final outcome came very close to the aggregated party list result. We always try to focus on the unique factors of every race, especially in one with as many twists and turns as D1 had this year, but sometimes the easiest answer is best. These races basically fell along party lines.
D12 was one of the districts that the DPP yielded to the NPP. Huang Kuo-chang beat seven term KMT incumbent and scion of the royal vizier’s household, Lee Ching-hua. For all the uniqueness of the two candidates, the final result was almost exactly the same as the blue/green party vote.
D9 includes all of Yonghe plus a bit of Zhonghe. D8 is the rest of Zhonghe. The part of Zhonghe in D9 is bluer than the rest of Zhonghe and almost as blue as Yonghe. On the table, I show all of Zhonghe as ~D8 (read: not quite exactly D8) and all of Yonghe as ~D9. You should mentally adjust D8 to be a bit greener.
The DPP didn’t bother nominating anyone in D9, one of the bluest districts in the country. The alliance with independent Lee Hsin-chang didn’t seem to work out very well. Lee ended up with under 30% while the green camp party lists had almost 40%. This is still a very blue district, and there was very little chance of winning. Still, parties should try to soak up all their potential votes, and this alliance led 10% of voters who might want to support a DPP candidate to look elsewhere.
D8 was a straight party to party fight, so it isn’t relevant to this post’s topic. However, I can’t resist a tangent. D8 is Chang Ching-chung’s district. You might remember him as the guy who set off the Sunflower movement. The party list numbers say that D8 is – incredibly – now almost a tossup district. However, “30 Second Chang” lost by a whopping 25,000 votes. This might be one of those rare districts in which the partisan balance can’t explain almost everything. It is quite possible that a number of voters who would have otherwise voted for the KMT were disgusted by Chang’s behavior in the legislature.
On to Taoyuan. Four of the six electoral districts cross administrative lines. D4 is most of Taoyuan District, but a little bit goes into D1. This doesn’t have much partisan impact on either D1 or D4. D3 includes most of Zhongli, but a little bit of Zhongli goes into D6. This is important, since the part that is in D6 is almost entirely military communities and votes heavily for the KMT. In your head, please adjust D3 to be somewhat greener and D6 to be somewhat bluer than the table shows.
|list||List||List %||List %||Dist||Dist|
For this post, we are mostly interested in D6, where the DPP cooperated with an independent. However, I can’t resist a comment or two about Taoyuan as a whole.
Holy shit! Taoyuan is green?? I know the DPP won the mayoral election in 2014, but I’m still coming to grips with this stunning transformation of the political landscape. (Ok, sorry for that outburst.)
All the races except D2 were very close. D1 and D4 should have been comfortable DPP wins, but the KMT incumbents seem to have made up some ground and turned them into closer races. D3 is probably still slightly blue, even after accounting for the parts of Zhongli that are in D6. However, this party list result goes a long way toward explaining the tight district race.
The independent allied with the DPP won D6 in one of the biggest upsets of election night. However, the party list results suggest that maybe it wasn’t such a big upset after all. The KMT candidate won in Zhongli by 6000 votes, so it looks as if this race went almost exactly along party lines. However, if that is correct, the DPP might have been able to win this district with its own candidate. Remember, once in the legislature, there is no guarantee that an independent legislator will always cooperate with the DPP. Given the choice, they should always prefer legislator from their own party. Since they did win what most people thought was an unwinnable race, it’s hard to criticize the decision to cooperate with an independent too much. They might have had polling data that said D6 was a tossup partisan district, but I can personally attest that years of staring at KMT victories make a person hesitant to believe those data. I guess I’ll say that even if the cooperation strategy wasn’t exactly a mistake, it also wasn’t the smashing success that many people think it was.
Let’s look at a few numbers from Taichung. D2 and D7 have a small overlap, and D1 and D6 were DPP landslides, so let’s look at the other four districts.
|list||List||List %||List %||Dist||Dist|
D3 was one of the three districts that the DPP yielded to the NPP. Like the other two, this one ended up almost perfectly along partisan lines. Remind me again why the DPP couldn’t run its own candidate in this district.
According to the party list vote, D4 and D5 are almost exactly the same; both should have a clear green advantage. However, the DPP won D4 by a landslide while the KMT won D5 by a landslide. Perhaps Lu Hsiu-yen in D5 should speak a little more loudly in the upcoming fights over the KMT’s future, since she is one of the very few party members with an electoral record to be proud of. It may have helped that the DPP did not run a candidate against her but instead entrusted the duty to a TSU politician. Perhaps some of the more moderate voters couldn’t stomach voting for a candidate from an extremist party. Again, the collaborationist strategy doesn’t seem to have much payoff.
Chiang Chi-chen in D8 also turned a big partisan disadvantage into a victory, but he did it against a DPP candidate. The NPP wanted to run Hsu Yung-ming in this district, but the DPP wouldn’t yield. That decision didn’t work out so well. This is a good reminder that we shouldn’t assume that the decision not to collaborate will always work out well. Who knows; Hsu might have been able to absorb all the green votes and defeat Chiang.
The last case is Hsinchu County, where the blue party lists had a 54.0-39.5% (143,018 to 104,517) advantage over the green party lists. Hsinchu was a complicated three-way race in which all the candidates had a history in one of the other parties. It probably isn’t the best place to try to apply a party vote-based analytic strategy. The DPP backed independent lost to the KMT candidate by a margin of 93,495 to 85,170. I have no idea whether that was a success or not. If the DPP had a true-green candidate able to connect with grassroots voters, they probably would have done better with her. However, I’m not sure that person exists right now.
Overall, I am quite skeptical that the collaboration strategy helped the DPP. I think they could have won as many or more seats if they had nominated candidates in all 73 districts. They also wouldn’t have invited their voters to vote for other parties or asked them to cast a (painful) ballot for an erstwhile blue camp politician. Of course, there weren’t obvious DPP candidates to run in all the districts, and there were probably compelling national-level strategic reasons for Tsai Ing-wen to want cooperation with a number of smaller parties. And since the DPP won a comfortable single-party majority, it is hard to evaluate their electoral strategy too harshly. However, strictly from a district-level outcome-based perspective, I have to conclude that I think the costs of cooperating outweighed the benefits for the DPP.
I’ve been inputting election numbers for years, so I’ve seen lots of cases of hopeless races where the main challenger loses by a huge margin. What’s different this year is that the hopeless challengers are KMT candidates. You can’t imagine how disorienting it is to me to see a result like DPP 146,414, KMT 35,742. This does not compute. However, that’s a real result from Tainan 2. I think the best way to illustrate just how badly a few KMT candidates got beaten is to point out that a few of them won’t get their security deposits back. To discourage frivolous candidacies, candidates pay a security deposit when they register. As long as they can get at least one-third as many votes as the winner (or one-half in a multi-seat district) they get the deposit back after the election. Of course, the major candidates ALWAYS get the deposit back. Except not this year.
Pingtung 3: KMT nominee Hsu Chin-ju 許謹如 got 12.8% of the vote. DPP winner Chuang Jui-hsiung 莊瑞雄 got 4.18 times as many votes.
Tainan 2: KMT nominee Huang Yao-sheng 黃耀盛 got 18.7% of the vote. DPP winner Huang Wei-che 黃偉哲 got 4.10 times as many votes.
Kaohsiung 4: KMT nominee Kuo Lun-hao 郭倫豪 got 23.2% of the vote. DPP winner Lin Tai-hua 林岱樺 got 3.25 times as many votes.
Tainan 1: KMT nominee Huang Jui-kun 黃瑞坤 got 22.2% of the vote. DPP winner Yeh Yi-chin 葉宜津 got 3.21 times as many votes.
There were also seven other districts in which the DPP nominee got more than twice as many votes as the KMT nominee. Those KMT nominees got their security deposits back, but some of these cases were very close, including Tainan 5 in which the DPP candidate got 2.97 times as many votes as the KMT candidate.
It’s just strange to see districts in which the KMT is not merely the minority, but is actually no longer competitive.
Update: Bob Kao from the fantastic Taiwan Law Blog has pointed out (correctly) that I’m a big, fat, stupid idiot. According to the Article 32 of the Election and Recall Law, the threshold for getting one’s security deposit back is one-tenth of all eligible voters, not one-third of the winner’s total.
According to my (new) calculations,Hsu Chin-ju in Pingtung 3, who got 8.0% of the eligible votes was the only KMT candidate who fell below the threshold. The candidates in Tainan 2 (12.0%) and Tainan 1 (13.2%) just barely cleared the threshold. So sorry, almost all of the KMT candidates will get their security deposit back.
So what is the one-third thing that my lousy memory told me was the threshold for security deposits. According to Article 43 of the Election and Recall Law, any candidate (in a single seat district) getting at least one-third of the votes of the winner is eligible for a subsidy of NT30 per vote. The four candidates listed above will not be getting that subsidy.
This is perhaps not as big a blow as you might think. Since they didn’t get many votes, the subsidies wouldn’t have been very large anyway. While all money is useful, these subsidies would have only covered a fraction of campaign costs. Here is the amount they won’t be getting:
Pingtung 3: KMT nominee Hsu Chin-ju 許謹如: NT 482,910
Tainan 2: KMT nominee Huang Yao-sheng 黃耀盛: NT 1,072,260
Kaohsiung 4: KMT nominee Kuo Lun-hao 郭倫豪: NT 1,131,330
Tainan 1: KMT nominee Huang Jui-kun 黃瑞坤 NT 1,100,520
Anyway, the general point I was trying to make still stands. To put it in the type of legalese that Bob will appreciate: Holy shit, there were some KMT candidates who got totally destroyed!
Turnout was lower than many expected. The previous low for turnout in a presidential election was 74.4% (in 2012), but this time turnout dropped to 66.3%. Some drop was expected, since the presidential race was not close and because the election was scheduled so near to the Lunar New Year holiday and university students’ final exams. However, many people have also speculated that a disproportionate number of demoralized blue voters would stay at home. We’ll never have a definitive answer to whether this was the case because we don’t have exit polls. The post-election academic surveys will provide some evidence, but those won’t be release for several months.
In the meantime, we can look for crude patterns in the district-level turnout data. If the hypothesis is correct, we should probably see larger drops in turnout in blue districts than in green districts. I’m going to use the number of valid votes to calculate turnout. (The actual figure includes both valid and invalid votes. These numbers are now available on the CEC website, but I’m going to save time and just use valid votes. Arguably, valid votes are a better indicator, since many disgruntled blue voters may have cast invalid votes.) Overall, turnout in the 73 districts dropped from 74.0% to 65.2%, a drop of 9.2%. However, some dropped more. For example, Hsinchu County dropped 12.4% and New Taipei 9 dropped 12.0%. Some dropped less, such as Chiayi County 1 (6.0%) and Pingtung 2 (6.8%). Not coincidentally, Hsinchu County and New Taipei 9 are very blue, while Chiayi County 1 and Pingtung 2 are very green. Those examples are not misleading, though the pattern is not usually quite so stark. The correlation between the drop in turnout and Tsai’s 2012 vote share in the 73 districts is 0.55, a very strong relationship. However, much of that is driven by Kinmen and Lienchiang, where lower turnout was probably driven by a surge in household registrations by people who don’t actually live there. If we only look at the other 71 districts, the correlation is 0.26, which is still quite impressive for such a crude test. Thus, there is some evidence for the hypothesis that blue voters disproportionately stayed home.
However, let’s not overdo it. There are some people who seem to think that this was the main cause of the KMT’s defeat. There is simply no way that a drop of less than 10% in turnout can make up for a 25% gap in the presidential vote or even a gap of about 13% in the average legislative district race. Remember, many of those people who didn’t vote would have voted for the green side, so you can’t simply add 9.2% to the KMT’s total. There might have been a pattern, but it certainly did not drive the overall result. The KMT’s disaster cannot simply be blamed on poor turnout.
I’m really too exhausted to write anything in depth about the election results. So instead of a full recap, let me just touch on diversity and pluralism. Taiwan has set new highs in both the proportion of women and indigenous legislators.
By my count, 43 of the 113 legislators will be women. That makes 38.1%. Around the world, the top three countries for percentage of women in the national parliament are Rwanda, Bolivia, and Cuba. Um, how do I say this politely? Those are not exactly the countries we want to emulate. Let’s restrict the comparison to only countries that are rated as “free” in the latest Freedom House report. Of these, Taiwan now places 10th in the world in the proportion of women in its national legislature. Moreover, of the top 20 countries, only Norway, Germany, and now Taiwan also have a female head of government. This places Taiwan as a world leader for gender equality in the political realm. Moreover, it is notable that Tsai is not from a political family. Unlike almost all other Asian female leaders, Tsai did not inherit her power. In fact, Tsai is not unique among female politicians in Taiwan. Former VP Annette Lu, Kaohsiung mayor Chen Chu, and vice-speaker and erstwhile KMT presidential nominee Hung Hsiu-chu also rose to very powerful positions in the political structure, and none of them came from a political family.
|Rank||Country||% Female||Female Head of Government|
This has been a gradual process. Women have slowly built their share of seats over the past 25 years. This gives me confidence that women are winning real power and that those gains are sustainable.
|district||list||all women||total seats||% women|
This year is also a milestone for indigenous representation. In addition to the six legislators elected from indigenous districts, two others were elected on the DPP and NPP party lists. Eight indigenous legislators is not a record in the absolute sense, but does mark a new high in the percentage of seats held by indigenous legislators.
|district||list||all indigenous||total seats||% indigenous|
In most countries, if there are seats reserved for indigenous people, the goal is to allow them to be represented in numbers proportional to their share of the overall population. In other words, the goal is to prevent them from being underrepresented. Taiwan has made a different choice. In Taiwan, voters with indigenous status make up about 1.5% of the population, but they now hold over7% of the seats in the national legislature. Taiwan has chosen to significantly over-represent indigenous people.
This effort to give voice to women and minorities speaks to the pride that Taiwanese have in their diverse and pluralistic society.
On a related note, the DPP has set a party record for performance in indigenous districts, and by quite a margin.
|DPP||valid||vote share||seats won|
Since we’re talking about DPP records, they set a new high for presidential elections in all of the 22 cities and counties. In fact, they beat their previous high for any type of election (presidential, mayoral, legislative) in 11 of the 22 cities and counties.
|New Taipei||2004||46.9||2001 mayor||51.3||54.8||**|
|Hsinchu County||2004||35.9||1989 mayor||51.1||42.5||**|
|Chiayi County||2004||62.8||2014 mayor||63.1||65.4||**|
|Hsinchu City||2004||44.9||1997 mayor||56.1||51.2||*|
|Chiayi City||2004||56.1||2004 prez||56.1||59.9||**|
*DPP record high for presidential races; ** DPP record high for any election
I’ll dig more into the results over the next few days. For now, let me just say that this was a tremendous electoral victory for the DPP and a devastating defeat for the KMT.
Four years ago on election day, I posted the following message. It is fun and easy to be on the winning side, so if your candidate wins tonight, enjoy the win and be happy. This message is for the people who won’t be as happy tonight. Democracy depends on people being willing to lose, and tonight it is your turn to shoulder the burden of making democracy work. I thank you in advance for courageously accepting this responsibility.