Blue-White cooperation?

The biggest question in the presidential campaign thus far has been whether the opposition could coalesce around a single candidate. The polls seem to indicate that Lai has a healthy lead, but the opposition candidates could make it a close race if they can cooperate. I’ll look at the polling data in greater depth in another post, but for now let’s assume that the conventional wisdom is correct.

I’ve had my doubts the cooperation between the KMT and TPP is possible. For one thing, the two sides are fairly even in the polls, so it’s not obvious which side should yield to the other side.

For another, neither side seems interested at all in taking the number two spot on the ticket. Both seem to think that cooperation means the other side will cooperate with them, not that they will cooperate with the other side. The TPP has usually been a little bit ahead in the polls, so they naturally think that they should have a fair shot at the top spot on any joint ticket. Moreover, the second spot on a joint ticket would probably be a death sentence for their party. The only way Ko will be an influential person over the next four years is if he is either the president or the head of a party that controls the balance of power in the legislature. The TPP will have a hard time winning many of the 73 district seats. Their best chance to do well in the legislative elections is to win a lot of party list seats. If they can win 20 or 25% of the party list votes, they might win 7 to 10 party list seats, and that might be enough to determine the balance of power in the legislature. It will be a lot easier to ask voters to support the TPP on the party list if Ko is on the ballot running for president. If he is merely a vice presidential candidate, all the focus will be on the contest between the KMT and DPP and the TPP will be marginalized. Don’t expect to see presidential candidate Hou enthusiastically reminding voters to vote for the TPP on the party list.

On the KMT side, they seem to have assumed from the beginning that cooperation meant the KMT would get the top spot. Even when Hou clearly trailed Ko in the polls, the KMT kept talking about a Hou-Ko ticket. There is a clear political logic to this. In a majoritarian system like Taiwan’s, you never want to be the third party. Accepting Ko as the presidential candidate also means accepting the possibility that he could win and assemble a strong enough coalition to push the KMT into third place. (Even worse, he could turn out to be a closet Taiwan nationalist. KMT true believers still have nightmares about Lee Teng-hui.) The ideal KMT outcome seems to be the 2004 model, in which James Soong, who led a smaller party but was clearly more popular, deferred to far less charismatic Lien Chan. It’s worth remembering that even though they lost the 2004 election, the KMT bounced back to win in 2008 while the PFP faded into oblivion. Unfortunately for the KMT this time, Ko is a different animal than Soong. Song was a true believer in the ROC church, and he placed a high value on defeating the DPP, even at the cost of his personal and partisan fortunes. Ko is not motivated by a similar drive to “save” the ROC. He is much more focused on gaining power for himself rather than defeating somebody else. His calls to throw the DPP out of power are a means to an end, not the end itself.

My skepticism about the feasibility of a blue-white coalition aside, the two sides have taken significant steps over the last few days to discuss the possibility of cooperation. Yesterday, King Pu-tsung, who is running Hou’s campaign, had a high-profile meeting with Huang Shan-shan, who is running Ko’s campaign. My question was, were they sincerely trying to find a mode of cooperation, or was this merely political theater?

Remember, candidates formally register between November 20th and 24^th, so time is of the essence. Long, drawn out negotiations are not an option. They need a quick agreement that can be implemented in short order.

The TPP’s proposal was fairly simple. The joint candidate would be determined entirely by opinion polls. Five pollsters would pit Hou and Ko directly against Lai, and the one with the highest average would be named the candidate. Half the interviews would be conducted by landline, and the other half would be done by cell phone. This is basically the procedure the DPP used four years ago to settle the nomination fight between Tsai and Lai. Not coincidentally, this is also the most advantageous procedure for Ko, something that becomes more obvious when you contrast it with the KMT’s very, very different proposal.

The KMT proposed holding a “democratic primary,” which it claimed was the long-standing practice in the USA, France, and South Korea. Voting stations would be set up either in the 22 cities and counties or the 73 legislative districts. Anyone would be eligible to vote, but they would have to sign a pledge of loyalty to certain ideals and they would have to present their ID card.

This system would be tremendously advantageous to the KMT. The TPP has almost no national organization and could not possibly put together such a complex mechanism in so little time, so the entire process would inevitably be organized and run by the KMT. The TPP would just have to trust that the KMT was not bending the rules to its advantage. The primary itself would be a contest of voter mobilization, and this also plays into the KMT’s advantages. The KMT has local organizations everywhere who can bring their local networks of (mostly older) voters to the voting booth, organizing transportation (and “incentives”) if necessary. The TPP, in contrast, would have to rely entirely on self-mobilization by their (mostly younger) supporters. It’s not hard to imagine a few young people on Gogoros being swamped by legions of voters getting off charter buses from every corner of Hsinchu or Pingtung Counties. The loyalty pledge and ID card might also discourage TPP supporters from participating. Remember, most TPP supporters don’t like either major party. They might not be enthusiastic about giving their personal information to a KMT party worker or pledging to support the KMT in the general election after the KMT inevitably won this “democratic” primary. To put it simply, this was not a proposal that the TPP could even consider, much less accept.

As if to hammer home the point this was not a good faith proposal, the KMT added one more comment. The reason for the ID card requirement was to ensure that no one stuffed the ballots 灌票. King Pu-tsung stated that shenanigans were far less likely to occur with the “democratic” primary than with opinion polls. Never mind that the KMT has used polling primaries many times in the past without worrying about this, and any fears that the other major party would support the weaker candidate have been repeatedly debunked. This was a clear effort to delegitimize polling and argue that their method of direct voting was more democratic, scientific, and legitimate.

The two sides are so far apart and the time is so short that it seems extremely unlikely they will find a mutually acceptable solution. All in all, this strikes me more as an effort to speak to their own bases – especially on the KMT side – than to actually consolidate the opposition forces. They want to be able to tell their loyal supporters that they tried to cooperate but the other side was unreasonable and obstinate. We seem headed for a three-way race, not a head-to-head contest between the DPP and the opposition.

The two sides did agree to hold three TV debates. We’ll see if those actually happen. If they do and the two sides are no closer to cooperating, it will be interesting to see if they spend more time and energy attacking each other or the DPP