Wu Den-yi was elected KMT chair about a month ago. At the time, one of the popular theories about his win was that it represented a victory of the Taiwan-oriented local factions over the orthodox Chinese nationalist wing. (Or, if you prefer, the Taiwanese wing defeated the Mainlander wing.) In this line of thought, Wu was inheriting the support previously won by Lee Teng-hui, Wang Jin-pyng, and Huang Min-hui. The unspoken implication was that native Taiwanese Wu would lead the KMT in a more localist direction, perhaps even becoming another Lee Teng-hui.
I’ve never been too enamored with this discourse, but I keep talking with smart people who believe it is more or less what happened. I see Wu as a firm believer in the orthodox KMT catechism. He may not be as extreme as Hung Hsiu-chu, but all of his statements and actions over the past four decades seem to me to indicate someone who is quite comfortable with the direction established by Lien Chan and Ma Ying-jeou. That is, he should be acceptable to both wings of the party. I think what happened in the chair election is that KMT members – who want to return to power – simply chose the strongest leader.
So what if I’m wrong? What if Wu was elected because the local factions mobilized to support him? What would that look like? One notable difference between the KMT chair elections in 2016 and 2017 was that there were about 50% more eligible voters and valid votes in the 2017 election. Many people have speculated that this was the result of local factions signing up new party members in support of Wu. If so, we should see a clear pattern. There should be far more new voters in central and southern Taiwan, where the local factions are strongest. Moreover, if Wu inherited and built on Huang Min-hui’s 2016 support, the increase should be greatest in places where more new people signed up for KMT membership.
Let’s look at the results of the 2016 and 2017 KMT party chair elections. The KMT tallied results for individual ballot boxes, but I can only find the full results aggregated up to the city and county level:
2016 KMT party chair election
陳學聖 | 李新 | 黃敏惠 | 洪秀柱 | ||
Chen | Lee | Huang | Hung | ||
合計 | 139558 | 6784 | 7604 | 46341 | 78829 |
. | |||||
台北市 | 12802 | 756 | 901 | 2990 | 8155 |
新北市 | 16694 | 723 | 916 | 4131 | 10924 |
基隆市 | 1931 | 121 | 136 | 504 | 1170 |
宜蘭縣 | 2845 | 139 | 138 | 1110 | 1458 |
桃園市 | 10745 | 1597 | 787 | 1698 | 6663 |
新竹縣 | 3378 | 153 | 191 | 1389 | 1645 |
新竹市 | 1944 | 74 | 112 | 485 | 1273 |
苗栗縣 | 5204 | 216 | 265 | 1796 | 2927 |
台中市 | 11238 | 548 | 751 | 3484 | 6455 |
彰化縣 | 8074 | 249 | 325 | 4217 | 3283 |
南投縣 | 4038 | 159 | 210 | 1905 | 1764 |
雲林縣 | 4354 | 148 | 188 | 2627 | 1391 |
嘉義縣 | 3842 | 47 | 92 | 2765 | 938 |
嘉義市 | 2678 | 27 | 62 | 1748 | 841 |
台南市 | 11102 | 316 | 561 | 3895 | 6330 |
高雄市 | 15996 | 632 | 1048 | 4956 | 9360 |
屏東縣 | 6358 | 197 | 370 | 2808 | 2983 |
花蓮縣 | 3420 | 189 | 243 | 795 | 2193 |
台東縣 | 2738 | 121 | 117 | 1315 | 1185 |
澎湖縣 | 1367 | 86 | 79 | 361 | 841 |
金門縣 | 1606 | 74 | 23 | 132 | 1377 |
連江縣 | 445 | 33 | 14 | 65 | 333 |
海外黨部 | 6759 | 179 | 75 | 1165 | 5340 |
And here is the 2017 election:
valid | Hung | Han | Pan | Hau | Chan | Wu | |
有效票 | 洪秀柱 | 韓國瑜 | 潘維剛 | 郝龍斌 | 詹啟賢 | 吳敦義 | |
合計 | 272704 | 53065 | 16161 | 2437 | 44301 | 12332 | 144408 |
. | |||||||
台北市 | 26887 | 5209 | 1689 | 248 | 6250 | 1338 | 12153 |
新北市 | 28684 | 6486 | 1658 | 240 | 4544 | 984 | 14772 |
基隆市 | 4537 | 461 | 217 | 33 | 1586 | 156 | 2084 |
宜蘭縣 | 6055 | 1244 | 302 | 63 | 749 | 180 | 3517 |
桃園市 | 18372 | 4001 | 998 | 132 | 4067 | 458 | 8716 |
新竹縣 | 7192 | 955 | 400 | 70 | 1413 | 346 | 4008 |
新竹市 | 5253 | 1576 | 355 | 78 | 696 | 212 | 2336 |
苗栗縣 | 9671 | 1641 | 693 | 100 | 1579 | 445 | 5213 |
台中市 | 22588 | 3934 | 1121 | 151 | 4035 | 707 | 12640 |
彰化縣 | 18808 | 2566 | 889 | 172 | 2770 | 1002 | 11409 |
南投縣 | 8566 | 879 | 234 | 31 | 577 | 179 | 6666 |
雲林縣 | 8765 | 1062 | 1476 | 95 | 1390 | 288 | 4454 |
嘉義縣 | 5038 | 898 | 198 | 19 | 524 | 391 | 3008 |
嘉義市 | 4810 | 1078 | 267 | 63 | 817 | 675 | 1910 |
台南市 | 20535 | 4588 | 1262 | 178 | 3124 | 1882 | 9501 |
高雄市 | 36623 | 6657 | 2239 | 389 | 4645 | 1695 | 20998 |
屏東縣 | 14798 | 2377 | 667 | 108 | 1418 | 476 | 9752 |
花蓮縣 | 9645 | 2681 | 690 | 156 | 1424 | 318 | 4376 |
台東縣 | 5100 | 810 | 255 | 42 | 1193 | 114 | 2686 |
澎湖縣 | 2711 | 768 | 124 | 32 | 546 | 302 | 939 |
金門縣 | 2382 | 747 | 148 | 20 | 448 | 91 | 928 |
連江縣 | 574 | 124 | 53 | 1 | 97 | 26 | 273 |
海外黨部 | 5110 | 2323 | 226 | 16 | 409 | 67 | 2069 |
You will notice right away that the total number of valid votes nearly doubled, increasing by 133,146. At the same time, the number of votes won by the (supposed) representative of local factions (Huang in 2016, Wu in 2017) increased by 98,067. It seems plausible that these two shifts are related.
98,068 divided by 133,146 is .74. A reasonable interpretation is the pre-existing party members voted basically as they had in 2016, but 74% of the new party members voted for Wu. However, once you start looking at individual cities and counties, things start to break down. We expect Wu’s mobilization efforts to be most effective in central and southern Taiwan, where the local factions supposedly went all out to mobilize new party members for Wu. Assuming Wu’s increase came entirely from new members, he only won 8% of the new members in Chiayi City and 20% in Chiayi County. Those results can perhaps be explained away because Huang was from Chiayi, so they might have already mobilized for her in 2016. However, if you accept the hometown effect for Chiayi, you also have to discount the high ratio in Nantou, since that is Wu’s home. Throughout the rest of the region, the ratio does not differ markedly from the national average; if anything it is slightly lower. At any rate, Wu’s supposed share of new voters is lower in all of central and southern Taiwan (excepting Nantou) than in New Taipei (.89) and Taoyuan (.92). These are not the supposed loci of local factions in Taiwan.
Increase | Increase | |||
Wu-Huang | Valid | ratio | ||
合計 | 98067 | 133146 | 0.74 | |
. | ||||
台北市 | Taipei | 9163 | 14085 | 0.65 |
新北市 | New Taipei | 10641 | 11990 | 0.89 |
基隆市 | Keelung | 1580 | 2606 | 0.61 |
宜蘭縣 | Yilan | 2407 | 3210 | 0.75 |
桃園市 | Taoyuan | 7018 | 7627 | 0.92 |
新竹縣 | Hsinchu Cnty | 2619 | 3814 | 0.69 |
新竹市 | Hsinchu City | 1851 | 3309 | 0.56 |
苗栗縣 | Miaoli | 3417 | 4467 | 0.76 |
台中市 | Taichung | 9156 | 11350 | 0.81 |
彰化縣 | Changhua | 7192 | 10734 | 0.67 |
南投縣 | Nantou | 4761 | 4528 | 1.05 |
雲林縣 | Yunlin | 1827 | 4411 | 0.41 |
嘉義縣 | Chiayi Cnty | 243 | 1196 | 0.20 |
嘉義市 | Chiayi City | 162 | 2132 | 0.08 |
台南市 | Tainan | 5606 | 9433 | 0.59 |
高雄市 | Kaohsiung | 16042 | 20627 | 0.78 |
屏東縣 | Pingtung | 6944 | 8440 | 0.82 |
花蓮縣 | Hualien | 3581 | 6225 | 0.58 |
台東縣 | Taitung | 1371 | 2362 | 0.58 |
澎湖縣 | Penghu | 578 | 1344 | 0.43 |
金門縣 | Kinmen | 796 | 776 | 1.03 |
連江縣 | Lienchiang | 208 | 129 | 1.61 |
海外黨部 | Overseas | 904 | -1649 | -0.55 |
Maybe I’m thinking of this wrong. Maybe the point is that the growth in new KMT voters was much higher in central and southern Taiwan. The valid votes grew by 95% from 2016 to 2017. In 2016, Huang Min-hui won 33.2% of the votes, while Wu Den-yi won 53.0% in 2017, for an increase of 19.7%. If it was mobilization, these two numbers should move together. For example, valid votes increased by 129% while Wu beat Huang by 26.4%. Both of these numbers are larger than the national average, and Kaohisung is in the south. The problem is that we don’t see similar numbers throughout the rest of center and south. For example, in Changhau valid votes increased substantially, by 133%. However, Wu only bested Huang by 8.4%. All those extra voters didn’t seem to be going to Wu. In Tainan, valid votes only grew by 85% and Wu only outperformed Huang by 11.2%. In fact, some of Wu’s best areas were in the north. Wu outperformed Huang by 31.6% in Taoyuan and 26.8% in New Taipei, but neither one of these places had a particularly large increase in new voters. If you stare really hard and long at this table, you might convince yourself that you see a pattern. However, you are probably hallucinating. The correlation between the two columns is 0.05, just about as close to zero as you will ever see.
% increase | Vote share | ||
Valid votes | Wu-Huang | ||
合計 | 95 | 19.7 | |
. | |||
台北市 | Taipei | 110 | 21.8 |
新北市 | New Taipei | 72 | 26.8 |
基隆市 | Keelung | 135 | 19.8 |
宜蘭縣 | Yilan | 113 | 19.1 |
桃園市 | Taoyuan | 71 | 31.6 |
新竹縣 | Hsinchu Cnty | 113 | 14.6 |
新竹市 | Hsinchu City | 170 | 19.5 |
苗栗縣 | Miaoli | 86 | 19.4 |
台中市 | Taichung | 101 | 25.0 |
彰化縣 | Changhua | 133 | 8.4 |
南投縣 | Nantou | 112 | 30.6 |
雲林縣 | Yunlin | 101 | -9.5 |
嘉義縣 | Chiayi Cnty | 31 | -12.3 |
嘉義市 | Chiayi City | 80 | -25.6 |
台南市 | Tainan | 85 | 11.2 |
高雄市 | Kaohsiung | 129 | 26.4 |
屏東縣 | Pingtung | 133 | 21.7 |
花蓮縣 | Hualien | 182 | 22.1 |
台東縣 | Taitung | 86 | 4.6 |
澎湖縣 | Penghu | 98 | 8.2 |
金門縣 | Kinmen | 48 | 30.7 |
連江縣 | Lienchiang | 29 | 33.0 |
海外黨部 | Overseas | -24 | 23.3 |
In the end, there just isn’t any compelling evidence for the idea that local factions elected Wu chair by mobilizing tons of new voters for him. Heck, there isn’t evidence that anyone mobilized new voters for Wu.
I think the increase in new KMT voters is related to party morale, not to the KMT party chair election. Morale was at a nadir in the aftermath of the 2016 wipeout, and lots of party members let their membership lapse. As morale has recovered (slightly), some of those party members have drifted back (and paid their dues). The turnout rate was also markedly higher this time. However, the number of eligible voters and valid votes are far below the levels of 2005, when the winner was widely expected to become the next president.
Valid votes | Eligible voters | turnout | |
2005 | 518324 | 1033854 | 50.2 |
2016 | 139558 | 337351 | 41.6 |
2017 | 272704 | 476147 | 58.1 |
At any rate, I think the evidence suggests that Wu Den-yi was elected by a fairly broad base of support within the KMT rather than by any specific group such as local factions or Taiwan nationalists. Admittedly, there is a limit to what we can see with crude data like this, so maybe it is best to state my conclusion in the negative. I don’t see any clear evidence for the local faction mobilization thesis.
June 29, 2017 at 7:30 pm |
Thanks for tracking down the data. I was struggling to find it on the KMT website right after the election. This is a great post and an important point. I’d just like to note it’s also possible Wu drove up his own turnout everywhere, and not disproportionately in the center and south, thanks in part to his national connections as premier and vice president. New Taipei and Taoyuan, for example, had a lot of money thrown their direction during the Ma administration for various development projects.
Hung Hsiu-chu’s a believer Wu’s organizational capabilities helped him win the race, e.g. in this interview she cites his “distribution of resources” and “care for others” as a party and government executive.
http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20170628004170-260407