Was the DPP’s alliance strategy successful

One of the DPP’s more controversial campaign decisions this year was to form alliances with various “progressive” parties and politicians in legislative races. The DPP did not nominate its own candidate in 11 of the 73 legislative district races. Instead, it supported a hodgepodge of 3 New Power Party, 1 TSU, 1 PFP, 1 Green/Social Democrat, and 5 independent candidates. All of these were nominated in what the DPP formally designated as “difficult” districts, so it seemed unlikely that the DPP could win any of them on its own. Instead, the DPP (probably Tsai) decided to follow last year’s successful Ko P model, cooperating with a candidate who might have some appeal across party lines.

How did this turn out? The NPP won all three of its races, and an independent candidate in Taoyuan 6 also won. It’s hard to fault any strategy that produced 4 victories in 11 seemingly impossible races, right?

Hold on there, hoss. If you’ve been reading this blog for any length of time, you probably know what’s coming. I think the cooperation strategy was actually not very successful at all. I think the DPP could have won all three districts that the NPP ran in, and it might have won two or three others. In other words, their alliance strategy may have cost them seats.

The DPP’s definition of a difficult district was always too restrictive. They designated 29 districts as “difficult” since their legislative candidates had won less than 42.5% in 2012. Given the DPP’s difficulties in indigenous districts, they needed to win at least 40 of the 73 districts. By designating 29 as difficult, they were considering 44 as clearly winnable. In hindsight, that seems laughable now. It should have been clearly wrong then too, since the DPP did quite well in the presidential and party list votes in some of the districts. At any rate, the 11 districts that they eventually yielded were chosen from these 29 difficult districts.

As we all know now, there has been a major swing in partisan patterns over the past four years. Districts that seemed close four years ago were landslides this time. Districts that were solidly blue last time were close or even flipped green this time. If the DPP’s allied candidates won five seats, was it because of their personal attractions, or were there simply enough green votes to go around this time?

My strategy for this analysis is to look at the party list votes. There were 18 parties. I classify five of them as green parties (DPP, NPP, TSU, Free Taiwan, Taiwan Independence), six of them as blue (KMT, MKT, PFP, New, MCFAP, Chinese Unification) and seven as unclear. The smaller parties were not formally allied with the camps, but I’ll assume that diehard independence (unification) voters would usually vote for the green (blue) camp candidate if forced to choose. It isn’t very many votes, so classifying the tiny parties doesn’t really affect things very much anyway. The most important unclear parties are the Green/SDP, Trees, and Faith and Hope Alliance. I’ll assume that, if forced to choose in a blue vs green legislative race, these voters would either abstain, vote for a minor party, or split their votes fairly evenly. (Green/SDP and Trees would probably tend to support the green side, while Faith and Hope would probably support the blue side.) To put it another way, we can probably simply ignore the unclear parties and concentrate on the blue and green camp votes.


Let’s look at Taipei City first. Unfortunately, the CEC aggregates party list votes up to the administrative district, and six of the eight electoral districts cross administrative lines. Still, these numbers are revealing.

  list List List % List %
  Green Blue Green blue
Taipei 696855 652971 47.8 44.8
Beitou 73180 58289 51.9 41.4
Shilin 86779 62815 54.1 39.2
Datong 43484 24657 60.2 34.1
Zhongshan 63996 52403 51.2 41.9
Songshan 50132 53468 44.7 47.7
Neihu 70662 69685 46.4 45.8
Nangang 31885 29429 48.4 44.7
Wanhua 57191 45848 52.3 41.9
Zhongzheng 37915 39695 44.8 46.9
Da-an 68673 80623 42.1 49.5
Xinyi 55753 60108 44.6 48.1
Wenshan 57205 75951 39.0 51.8

Taipei 1, where DPP city councilor Wu Su-yao beat seven-term KMT incumbent Ting Shou-chung, includes Beitou and a small portion of Shilin. Many people have talked about this result as an upset, but it is clear from the party vote that the green camp has a solid majority in this district. Wu simply consolidated the green vote and won easily. Taipei 2 (Datong and most of Shilin) was already a DPP district, so we’ll ignore it.

Taipei 5 (Wanhua and most of Zhongzheng) was Freddy Lim’s district. Many people, including me, thought that this should be considered a blue-leaning district, but the party vote shows us wrong. The green side had a significant advantage in Wanhua and was almost even in Zhongzheng. Freddy didn’t win because Lin Yu-fang self-destructed. Freddy won because the national partisan patterns shifted, and he was running in a majority green district.

Taipei 6 is Da-an. The DPP yielded this district to Fan Yun, of the SDP. She lost to the KMT candidate by a 46-35% margin. According to the party list votes, this district is about a 49-42 blue camp advantage. Fan Yun not only didn’t bring any extra votes to the table, she wasn’t even able to soak up all the available green camp votes. The DPP probably wouldn’t have won this race with a DPP candidate, but it might have been closer.

In Taipei 7 (Xinyi plus a bit of Songshan) and Taipei 8 (Wenshan plus a bit of Zhongshan), the DPP allied with two independents who until 2014 were deep blue KMT city councilors. Yang Shi-chiu in Taipei 7 surprised many people by coming within a few thousand votes of winning, a result that seemed to justify the collaboration. However, a look at the party list votes shows that, once again, it was the new national partisan balance that was doing much of the hard work. It must be pointed out that Yang’s vote was not simply the green vote. There were over 17,000 votes cast for the Green/SDP candidate, while the Green/SDP list only got about 5,000-6,000 votes. Many of these extra votes were probably from green camp supporters who could not stomach voting for an old deep blue politician such as Yang, regardless of the DPP’s recommendation. Yang may have brought a few votes with him from the blue side, but since the final margin looks like the difference in the party list vote, it appears that for every vote Yang brought over from the blue side, there were two green voters who couldn’t bring themselves to vote for him. The same sort of thing seems to have happened in Taipei 8, where the Green/SDP candidate got over 22,000 votes (but their list was under 10,000). In Taipei 8, the partisan balance was probably not close enough that the DPP could have won, but it might have had a chance in Taipei 7 if everything had gone just right. At the very least, those 30,000 or so green camp sympathizers who cast a protest vote for the Green/SDP would have been much happier at the voting booth, and that should count for something.

This leaves Taipei 3 and 4, the two really interesting districts. Taipei 3 (Zhongshan and two-thirds of Songshan) is very similar to Taipei 5 in partisan balance. In the past it has had a clear blue camp advantage, but this year the party list votes say it should have been a green district. The DPP originally nominated a candidate who would have been a strong contender to knock of the KMT imperial prince, Chiang Wan-an. Instead, the green camp support was split between a controversial doctor and a Green/SDP candidate. The cooperation strategy very probably cost the DPP this seat and launched the political career of a possible KMT star. Bad, bad mistake.

In Taipei 4 (Nangang and Neihu), the DPP supported PFP city councilor Huang Shan-shan. Huang came within 4,000 votes of winning, so it looks like the strategy almost paid off. The primary reason it failed was that a lot of – perhaps 30,000 – green camp voters simply couldn’t stomach voting for a PFP politician and voted for the TSU, NPP, or Green/SDP candidates. However, a look at the party list votes suggests that a straight KMT/DPP race would have been a tossup, or perhaps even favor the DPP. If Huang had run in a KMT/DPP/PFP race (as seemed likely), the DPP would have had a decisive advantage. They had a perfectly capable candidate who was eager to run, but DPP party leaders decided not to nominate her. The cooperation strategy probably cost the DPP this seat. It also pissed off a lot of loyal green camp voters, which is not a great party-building strategy.

These party list figures also call into question the effectiveness of the so-called “Ko P” strategy. Unlike most people, I’ve always assumed that Ko Wen-je’s personal appeal had very little to do with winning the 2014 mayor race. I have always thought that Sean Lien’s ability to drive away blue camp voters was the most important factor in Ko’s victory and that, if the KMT had nominated a relatively uncontroversial candidate such as Ting Shou-chung, it would have easily defeated Ko. Now I’m not so sure. These party list numbers suggest that the green side has an advantage in Taipei City. It isn’t big, but in a straight blue/green fight, the green side has a better chance of winning. In other words, the effect of Ko’s personal appeal and/or Lien’s negative personal appeal may have been simply to turn a narrow Ko victory into a Ko landslide.


  list List List % List % Dist Dist
  Green Blue Green blue Green blue
All N.T. 1100815 880483 52.0% 41.6%    
D1 105577 87464 49.9% 41.4% 110243 84582
~D8 104094 112012 44.9% 48.3% 100543 75738
~D9 48535 64953 39.6% 53.0% 46660 82761
D10 97454 72755 53.9% 40.2% 102854 67619
D11 77002 97341 40.7% 51.5% 67777 93962
D12 80347 69839 50.2% 43.6% 80508 68318

New Taipei has apparently become a solidly green city. (I am of the opinion that Eric Chu’s win in 2014 was a tremendous personal achievement, but, because the halo around him has faded so badly, there is no way he would win again if the mayoral election were held today.) Eight of the twelve electoral districts in New Taipei cross administrative lines. I am showing the four that do not plus two very interesting ones (D8 and D9).

D1, D10, and D11 all ended up being simple KMT vs DPP races. In all three, the final outcome came very close to the aggregated party list result. We always try to focus on the unique factors of every race, especially in one with as many twists and turns as D1 had this year, but sometimes the easiest answer is best. These races basically fell along party lines.

D12 was one of the districts that the DPP yielded to the NPP. Huang Kuo-chang beat seven term KMT incumbent and scion of the royal vizier’s household, Lee Ching-hua. For all the uniqueness of the two candidates, the final result was almost exactly the same as the blue/green party vote.

D9 includes all of Yonghe plus a bit of Zhonghe. D8 is the rest of Zhonghe. The part of Zhonghe in D9 is bluer than the rest of Zhonghe and almost as blue as Yonghe. On the table, I show all of Zhonghe as ~D8 (read: not quite exactly D8) and all of Yonghe as ~D9. You should mentally adjust D8 to be a bit greener.

The DPP didn’t bother nominating anyone in D9, one of the bluest districts in the country. The alliance with independent Lee Hsin-chang didn’t seem to work out very well. Lee ended up with under 30% while the green camp party lists had almost 40%. This is still a very blue district, and there was very little chance of winning. Still, parties should try to soak up all their potential votes, and this alliance led 10% of voters who might want to support a DPP candidate to look elsewhere.

D8 was a straight party to party fight, so it isn’t relevant to this post’s topic. However, I can’t resist a tangent. D8 is Chang Ching-chung’s district. You might remember him as the guy who set off the Sunflower movement. The party list numbers say that D8 is – incredibly – now almost a tossup district. However, “30 Second Chang” lost by a whopping 25,000 votes. This might be one of those rare districts in which the partisan balance can’t explain almost everything. It is quite possible that a number of voters who would have otherwise voted for the KMT were disgusted by Chang’s behavior in the legislature.


On to Taoyuan. Four of the six electoral districts cross administrative lines. D4 is most of Taoyuan District, but a little bit goes into D1. This doesn’t have much partisan impact on either D1 or D4. D3 includes most of Zhongli, but a little bit of Zhongli goes into D6. This is important, since the part that is in D6 is almost entirely military communities and votes heavily for the KMT. In your head, please adjust D3 to be somewhat greener and D6 to be somewhat bluer than the table shows.


  list List List % List % Dist Dist
  Green Blue Green Blue Green Blue
Taoyuan 513473 478398 48.2 44.9    
~D1 78616 60988 52.6% 40.8% 85955 80142
D2 95061 75718 52.3% 41.7% 89792 76473
~D3 86013 97886 42.9% 48.8% 77120 77510
~D4 106370 91846 49.9% 43.1% 86389 86220
D5 75277 83304 44.0% 48.7% 70202 72965
~D6 70797 65755 48.8% 45.4% 75510 76278


For this post, we are mostly interested in D6, where the DPP cooperated with an independent. However, I can’t resist a comment or two about Taoyuan as a whole.

Holy shit! Taoyuan is green?? I know the DPP won the mayoral election in 2014, but I’m still coming to grips with this stunning transformation of the political landscape. (Ok, sorry for that outburst.)

All the races except D2 were very close. D1 and D4 should have been comfortable DPP wins, but the KMT incumbents seem to have made up some ground and turned them into closer races. D3 is probably still slightly blue, even after accounting for the parts of Zhongli that are in D6. However, this party list result goes a long way toward explaining the tight district race.

The independent allied with the DPP won D6 in one of the biggest upsets of election night. However, the party list results suggest that maybe it wasn’t such a big upset after all. The KMT candidate won in Zhongli by 6000 votes, so it looks as if this race went almost exactly along party lines. However, if that is correct, the DPP might have been able to win this district with its own candidate. Remember, once in the legislature, there is no guarantee that an independent legislator will always cooperate with the DPP. Given the choice, they should always prefer legislator from their own party. Since they did win what most people thought was an unwinnable race, it’s hard to criticize the decision to cooperate with an independent too much. They might have had polling data that said D6 was a tossup partisan district, but I can personally attest that years of staring at KMT victories make a person hesitant to believe those data. I guess I’ll say that even if the cooperation strategy wasn’t exactly a mistake, it also wasn’t the smashing success that many people think it was.


Let’s look at a few numbers from Taichung. D2 and D7 have a small overlap, and D1 and D6 were DPP landslides, so let’s look at the other four districts.


  list List List % List % Dist Dist
  Green Blue Green Blue Green Blue
Taichung 754083 584991 52.7 40.9    
D3 95712 68362 55.3% 39.5% 93451 78334
D4 95366 82577 49.4% 42.7% 100649 70124
D5 104991 93352 49.1% 43.6% 84117 108446
D8 79055 59621 53.8% 40.6% 70549 72024


D3 was one of the three districts that the DPP yielded to the NPP. Like the other two, this one ended up almost perfectly along partisan lines. Remind me again why the DPP couldn’t run its own candidate in this district.

According to the party list vote, D4 and D5 are almost exactly the same; both should have a clear green advantage. However, the DPP won D4 by a landslide while the KMT won D5 by a landslide. Perhaps Lu Hsiu-yen in D5 should speak a little more loudly in the upcoming fights over the KMT’s future, since she is one of the very few party members with an electoral record to be proud of. It may have helped that the DPP did not run a candidate against her but instead entrusted the duty to a TSU politician. Perhaps some of the more moderate voters couldn’t stomach voting for a candidate from an extremist party. Again, the collaborationist strategy doesn’t seem to have much payoff.

Chiang Chi-chen in D8 also turned a big partisan disadvantage into a victory, but he did it against a DPP candidate. The NPP wanted to run Hsu Yung-ming in this district, but the DPP wouldn’t yield. That decision didn’t work out so well. This is a good reminder that we shouldn’t assume that the decision not to collaborate will always work out well. Who knows; Hsu might have been able to absorb all the green votes and defeat Chiang.

The last case is Hsinchu County, where the blue party lists had a 54.0-39.5% (143,018 to 104,517) advantage over the green party lists. Hsinchu was a complicated three-way race in which all the candidates had a history in one of the other parties. It probably isn’t the best place to try to apply a party vote-based analytic strategy. The DPP backed independent lost to the KMT candidate by a margin of 93,495 to 85,170. I have no idea whether that was a success or not. If the DPP had a true-green candidate able to connect with grassroots voters, they probably would have done better with her. However, I’m not sure that person exists right now.


Overall, I am quite skeptical that the collaboration strategy helped the DPP. I think they could have won as many or more seats if they had nominated candidates in all 73 districts. They also wouldn’t have invited their voters to vote for other parties or asked them to cast a (painful) ballot for an erstwhile blue camp politician. Of course, there weren’t obvious DPP candidates to run in all the districts, and there were probably compelling national-level strategic reasons for Tsai Ing-wen to want cooperation with a number of smaller parties. And since the DPP won a comfortable single-party majority, it is hard to evaluate their electoral strategy too harshly. However, strictly from a district-level outcome-based perspective, I have to conclude that I think the costs of cooperating outweighed the benefits for the DPP.





18 Responses to “Was the DPP’s alliance strategy successful”

  1. csempere109 Says:

    I don’t really understand the concept of allying with pan-blue independents unless they’re heavily invested in some particular domestic issue that the DPP is working on. But the smaller parties, yes. They can help the DPP look moderate, as the TSU has done. Certain parties could play the same role in domestic politics too.

  2. pdt090 Says:

    Liu isn’t the only central Taiwan KMT legislator who should be proud of herself. One of the most interesting things about this election is how well the KMT legislative candidates fared in central Taiwan. They took 6/14 of the seats, and the losing candidates in Changhua 2 & 3 ran ahead of Chu by double digits.

    This is a strong indication of how healthy the Taiwanese KMT is relative to the deep blue faction that dominates the party. If Hau or Hung wind up taking control of the party and continue to slight the 本土 factions, they may just jump ship – the KMT has clearly become an albatross for them at this point.

    • Michal Thim Says:

      Imho, one of the most significant developments pertaining to 2014 and 2016 elections is that we now consider 6/14 seats not a bad result for the KMT.

  3. Dan Stevenson (@danspot) Says:

    This stings the most: Re: Taipei 3, Chang Wan-an – “The cooperation strategy very probably cost the DPP this seat and launched the political career of a possible KMT star. Bad, bad mistake.”

  4. ジェームス (@jmstwn) Says:

    I just wrote about Taipei myself! I agree it didn’t work out. I assume they will run all DPP & NPP candidates next time. There’s not just the issue of voters unwilling to cross the blue-green divide as you mentioned, but also the problem of voters not even realizing there is cooperation underway. The victorious NPP candidates were not only green but also famous.

    To be fair to the DPP, they likely underestimated the size of the underlying partisan shift themselves, given how hard it is for us to believe. Might they even run someone in Lienchiang? There must be at least one DPP supporter living there right? 😉

    In Taipei 3 Lin I-hsiung forced their hand, and I think Taipei 4 was also about avoiding straight PFP v. DPP head-to-head races not just there (remember the KMT also wanted Huang Shan-shan to run for her, but she told them she’d already settled on the DPP) but in other districts if a KMT-PFP cooperation strategy had come together. It’s possible cooperation with the KMT would’ve killed the PFP’s reputation anyway so the DPP should’ve let it run its course, though.

    There’s no way to quantify this, but it’s possible that willingness to work across the blue-green and party-line divide at least made the DPP appear to be the inclusive and non-ideological party to centrists in comparison with the KMT, which could only ally with the New Party.

    • ジェームス (@jmstwn) Says:

      Basically the DPP still assumed DPP ID was a net negative in blue districts, but it was actually a positive this time, and if they do a good job governing the next 4 years it’ll become significantly more positive.

    • Michal Thim Says:

      “There’s no way to quantify this, but it’s possible that willingness to work across the blue-green and party-line divide at least made the DPP appear to be the inclusive and non-ideological party to centrists in comparison with the KMT, which could only ally with the New Party.”

      Yes, it is quite possible it aided DPP nation-wide, also affecting its party list performance.

  5. ジェームス (@jmstwn) Says:

    Some say the point of the alliance structure wasn’t to increase the chances of winning by putting forward more appealing candidates, but rather to increase the chances of winning by preventing 3rd party runs (by the NPP, TSU, and KMT exiles) that weakened DPP candidates splitting the opposition vote, or alliances with the KMT (by the PFP) expanding the blue vote, so if the DPP achieved these goals through these sacrifices it succeeded even if the candidate didn’t live up to green camp potential. But I guess without knowledge of internal party politics (which could leak now that the race is over) we can’t say what the real considerations were.

    • frozengarlic Says:

      My point is precisely that if you want to say the alliance strategy was successful, you have to use some of these other arguments about creating a better party image or working to a more inclusive style of politics. In the very narrow sense of immediate electoral payoffs assuming that the party votes were not endogenous to that softer DPP party image, the strategy seems to have had a negative payoff.

  6. Duncan Says:

    There may of course also be advantages to having the NPP holding a few seats in the LY rather than just some more DPP legislators. At the least it will help the DPP to look a little less partisan – I certainly can’t see it adopting a warm and open approach to the KMT once it’s in power.

  7. Paul Liu Says:

    DPP needs NPP to be the vanguard so they can be the central/reasonable party.

    • Michal Thim Says:

      I think we will see something quite different. NPP is not a replacement for TSU where it worked they way you suggest.

  8. Comfort Women and Post Election Thoughts | Translating Taiwanese Literature Says:

    […] How did everyone find the election? The majority of people I’ve met since I’ve been in Taiwan didn’t vote for Tsai Ing-wen yet (I’ve been asking). One guy I met said he’d been put off Tsai Ing-wen previously when he interviewed her, as he said he thought she changed her opinions with changes in the wind. I met another woman who voted for Eric Chu – she didn’t expand on her reasons though. (I realize I shouldn’t ask, but can’t help letting my curiosity getting the better of me.) I met one taxi driver who voted for Tsai, but seemed more passionate about the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rather than Tsai herself. For some quality post-election analysis you can visit the Frozen Garlic blog here. […]

  9. Irwin Says:

    I had suspected that DPP was leaving some winnable seats on the table by cooperating with others before the election so thanks for crunching the numbers. As a political junkie, this is all very fascinating stuff.

    Another way to look at the downside of cooperation strategy is to look at the total vote share of winning KMT candidates. By my count, only 7 KMT district winners won with 50% or more of the votes (New Taipei 9, New Taipei 11, Taichung 5, Changhua 1, Nantou 1, Nantou 2, Lienchiang). The rest of them hung on to their fingernails and cleared the post with less than majority votes in the district. Quite a few of them won with just 40~42% of the votes, including some of the DPP-yielded districts. The low watermark is Hsinchu County where KMT candidate won in a 3-way rest with just 36.7% of the votes.

    Of the 7 KMT majority vote district, Taichung 5 was the one DPP yielded to TSU and as Nathan noted already, probably a safe DPP pickup had it put forth its own candidate. Changhua 1 had a weak DPP parachute candidate and probably also should have been a DPP pickup too had it nominated someone more local. So that leaves 5 other “safe” KMT districts. If you add back Kinmen and Miaoli 1 where KMT candidates faced strong pan-blue candidates (PFP and MKT, respectively), you get an very odd looking “safe” electoral map for KMT – basically reminants of Hakka belt in Miaoli, Nantou KMT Govt employee stronghold, and islands in Fujian.

    What does this mean for DPP in the next election? The “difficult” list (i.e. the “safe” KMT seats I noted in the paragraph above) is just 7 seats. Will is try to squeeze out NPP or continue to cooperate with it?

  10. buckhead Says:

    All below are from my armchair campaign strategist point of view — obviously it’s too long to be taken seriously. And of course, hindsight is always 20/20.

    I agree with Mr. Garlic’s conclusion. If we examine it district by district, alliance strategy rarely worked out well in terms of attracting additional votes across partisan line, nor did it produce additional seats (comparing to vote just by partisan line). However, I think the alliance strategy itself is not to be blamed. It’s the execution that’s sub-par. The execution is bad on the following aspects:

    1) Half-ass alliance — didn’t consolidate fully within partisan line
    2) Like Mr. Garlic said — too restrictive definition on “difficult” district resulting from underestimating the magnitude of partisan line shift.
    3) Fail to nominate the better candidate.

    Let’s back to square one to justify the “alliance strategy”. There’s no physical rule to stop DPP from nominating all 73 districts — if all districts are one blue vs one green then that’s what they should do.

    However, the reality is that there’s second-tier party to fight for their survival (NP, PFP, TSU) and there’s this new “third camp” (white movement, citizen power whatever you want to call it) that they are so eager to prove themselves (NPP, Green/SDP). And of course there’s independents in a case by case scenario. So what happen if no alliance at all? Most likely all those second-tier parties will still run — and at whatever district they feel comfortable with. Most likely, this will result in (especially in district where the smaller parties have stronger candidate) vote splitting within green camp and most likely the blue camp candidate will benefit from it if he/she can consolidate all blue camp votes.

    In a sense, this is where the smaller parties can “blackmail” DPP to yield in nomination — to a degree. 林義雄 openly said that DPP should yield at least 20 districts — which is insane in my opinion.

    So the reasonable strategy for DPP is to put together a pan-green camp and nominate collaboratively, especially under the popular mantra “國民黨不倒,台灣不會好”. It looks good anyway since it made DPP more appealing to general public (not sure how many additional votes they’ll get though, probably a little bit in party list but that’s about it I guess). The more important thing is it prevents second-tier party back-stab your winnable districts. DPP was actually quite successfully in planning according to the above strategy, it held all winnable districts tightly (濁水溪以南)and make sure only one prominent (DPP) candidates got nominated. For those deep blue or blue-leaning districts, they are more than happy to send their allies to fight the uphill battle (of course, the candidate itself has to be good enough) if somehow they think they don’t have a qualified candidate in that district.

    NPP played along with it so that’s why Hung, Lin and Huang all nominated in so called “tough districts” and against very senior incumbent blue camp opponents. Hung is probably just coincidence that she happens to live in TaiChung 3 but Lin and Huang were obviously by choice. Freddy actually had to yield to Fan (from Green/SDP) so she can run Daan. I’m fine with that. I’m eager to hear some death metal in legislative yuan.

    For second-tier parties/independents I think it’s actually not that bad to play along. Yes you mostly will fight in district that big brother doesn’t want. However, you can expect DPP will support you within all their power because if they don’t do that you won’t even have a chance. And you get more national spotlight if it’s a very tight race — probably good for your party votes. Hung, Lin and Huang all played along pretty well and obviously harvest those air ballots quite well. Remember Mr. Garlic went to Hung’s campaign and found out it’s no different than any DPP campaign? Because it was actually ran by them. NPP volunteers fought against DPP campaign staff on how to run the campaign and it had to be settled by 林佳龍 himself.

    Even with those successful examples, most districts under alliance fell into one of (sometimes more than one) three categories of failure. Of course every district has its sub plot but let’s review it with some hard numbers and throw in my two cents in next comment.

  11. frozengarlic Says:

    “obviously it’s too long to be taken seriously”

    That describes this whole blog in a nutshell.

  12. buckhead Says:

    *well let’s try to be succinct, can we achieve that?*

    Few observations:

    1. Green/SDP is a big party pooper.

    Green/SDP decided not to collaborate with DPP for their noble causes (ok, I admire that). In fact, that’s why NPP had to be formed and went their own way. Huang and Freddy did mentioned in interviews that they (NPP) shard different views with Green/SDP regarding how to collaborate with DPP and that’s the main reason they chose to go separate ways.

    As the result, they are one of the big contributing factors in sabotaging pan-green camp campaigns in Taipei D3 (12% votes and green camp lost by 8%), D4 (4.8% votes and green camp lost by 2%), D7 (10% and 3%), and should make the campaign closer in D8 (12% and 14% ) and NTP D11 (12% and 15%), and also almost create real damage in Taoyuan D1 and D6. Well I’m making the obvious assumption that all of them will vote along partisan line. But I suppose most of them will if they have one unified candidate within partisan line.

    I guess the good thing about that is that at least in some districts (especially in urban areas) they are able to absorb enough votes to be a real force be reckon with. That might help in the future. However, they shall find out now that they really need to coordinate with friendlies.

    2. Strategy in Taipei is quite awful

    It’s….bad. Period. D3 primary process (or lack thereof) is a disaster. It didn’t consolidate anybody (except the really pissed off city councilor Liang) but also released Hsiao (from TSU) to D4. One primary killed two districts! They can also have better nomination in D7 and D8 in my opinion.

    Well they’ll be really sorry in 10 years that they didn’t nip the bud in D3 this time.

  13. DPP rising star Kao Chia-yu also went to NTU law | Taiwan Law Blog Says:

    […] seat before the DPP made the decision. Huang ultimately lost the race that Nathan Batto of Frozen Garlic believes Kao had a good chance of […]

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