Two weekend events

This weekend, each major party held a big event. The KMT retracted its nomination of Hung Hsiu-chu for president and replaced her with Eric Chu, while the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen opened their presidential campaign headquarters with a festive outdoor rally. I watched most of the former event on TV and Youtube, and I attended the latter event in person. I’m going to comment in this blog post about some of the contrasts between the two events, which could not have been more different. Warning: Like most comparisons of the two major parties over the past couple of years, this one isn’t going to be very flattering to the KMT.

At the most basic level, the KMT event was a hastily planned emergency event designed to try to take drastic action to prevent a rapidly approaching catastrophe. It was a closed event in which the party looked inward, trying to figure out how it would deal with a platform that was not gaining much popular support. The DPP event was scheduled long ago. It was a smoothly run rally that reeked of advance planning and attention to detail. It was outward-looking, with the public invited to enjoy the good cheer along with the party faithful.

Substantively, the Tsai campaign wanted the audience to know that it is thinking seriously about all sorts of policy questions. They introduced about three dozen scholars and experts in various policy areas who were leading teams for both the campaign and for Tsai’s think tank. This took two full sets of the program, with each consisting of a parade of experts and a speech. In between the various sets, they showed videos of Tsai’s campaign ads, and many of these were also policy-oriented. The message to the audience was clearly that, even though they didn’t have time to go into detail about each individual policy, they could easily do so if necessary. When Tsai spoke, she echoed this. She didn’t focus on any specific policy, but she stressed that her people had spent a lot of time in preparation, they had already announced several policies, and they would continue to roll out other policies over the next few weeks. Of course, white papers are a dime a dozen, but this fits in with my impression built up over the past few years of Tsai as a dead-serious policy wonk. A few months ago, the KMT tried labeling her as kongxincai, a play on the name of common leafy green vegetable with a hollow stem, implying that she has no substance undergirding her charisma. I never understood why they thought this was a promising line of attack, since substantive policy is probably one of her strongest points. They might do well to seek a more vulnerable angle.

(Aside: As I watched Tsai give a rousing speech while still conveying substantive heft, I couldn’t help but think back to her 2010 campaign for New Taipei mayor. I watched dumbfounded as she told a raucous crowd to calm down so she could lecture them on policy. After five years of nearly non-stop campaigning, she has learned an immense amount about how to work a crowd, giving them an opportunity to roar, building their excitement and commitment to the campaign while still sneaking in a bit of substantive policy. It’s hard to believe that this is the same person from five years ago.)

At the KMT event, there was a notable absence of any concrete policy discussion. Instead, when the KMT talked about ideas, they stuck to broad themes, such as maintaining the 92 Consensus and defending the ROC. They went out of their way to make it clear that they were not repudiating Hung Hsiu-chu for taking a position that was clearly outside the party’s mainstream. Speaker after speaker (including Chu) apologized to her (for the unfairness of retracting the nomination??). They are taking the position that the problem is entirely with the messenger and the presentation of the message rather than with the message itself.

The other big contrast that I want to focus on is the assumed relationship between the party and the state. Near the beginning of his remarks, Chu stated that the KMT’s future is tightly bound up with the future of Taiwan and of the ROC. In other words, an election disaster leading to the demise of the KMT could be expected to spell ruin for Taiwan and the ROC. Chu was not alone in tying the party and state together. Several previous speakers made similar remarks. The KMT is, in essence, the ROC. It is disheartening for me to hear this sort of rhetoric after more than two decades of democracy. The KMT elite seems to still believe the Leninist assumption that it is a vanguard party leading the state. They seem not to understand that in democracies, parties are a level below the state. The democratic system can remain quite healthy even as new parties emerge and old ones fade away (or crash and burn dramatically). No party is irreplaceable.

Tsai’s rhetoric was the polar opposite. She proclaimed that the KMT does not equal the ROC, and the DPP does not equal Taiwan. If the current generation fails to protect the democratic system, no one will regret it very much if the KMT and DPP are both swept into the dustbins of history. To my mind, this is a much more democratic way to think of parties. If they don’t perform well, they deserve to die. They also have no hegemonic claim to represent the entire population or state.

Tsai elaborated on this by talking about the DPP’s crushing defeat in 2008. Their only option, she said, was to rebuild the party through even more transparent and democratic means, trusting the people, trusting democracy, and trusting the institutions. When a politician talks about trusting democratic institutions, I get a little teary-eyed. Some might argue that the DPP’s actions haven’t always matched its rhetoric, but intellectually the current DPP leadership is far superior to the current KMT leadership in its understanding of the relationships between the party, the people, and the state.

Some of these differences naturally arise from the very different challenges the two parties currently face. The DPP expects to win and is preparing to govern. Thus, it looks outward. The KMT is trying not to implode, so it wants desperately to consolidate its previous support. This leads it to look inward.

The KMT did unleash one outward appeal. Defeatism be damned, Chu launched his campaign with the checks and balances appeal. What if, he asked, the KMT collapsed in the 2016 election? What if a party that has relied on mass conflict, street protests, and occupying the speaker’s podium won complete control of the executive branch, complete control of the legislature, complete control of local governments? There is no democracy without checks and balances! If that happened, would people be afraid and lose their freedom of speech or freedom to participate in politics? Would all public servants have to make decisions according to one party’s ideology? Would all teachers have to teach according to one party’s ideology? If that party completely controlled the central government, it could revise the laws and even amend the constitution at any time! We would really need to worry for the future of Taiwan’s democracy, Chu fretted.

I should note that Chu is not particularly famous for his sense of irony, and no one in the hall seemed to think he was joking.

They’re going to have to work on the delivery a bit. Maybe they will just focus on the part about democracy working better with a robust system of checks and balances and junk the “what if” scenarios. Eventually they should be able to figure out how to make this point without causing widespread snickering. If they do, it will be a powerful argument. Almost everyone, even those who want to see the KMT thoroughly rejected and discredited, wants a credible opposition force to keep the future DPP government honest and on its toes. I’m a bit surprised that Chu is pulling this appeal out so early since it is traditionally something that pops up in the last week or two. By raising it so early, Chu might be giving the DPP time to present counter-arguments (“That’s the only reason they have for you to vote for them??” “A crushing KMT defeat will be healthy for the system in the long run since it will force the KMT to fundamentally reform itself and become a healthy democratic party.”), and other parties might get in the act (“We in the PFP/MKT/SDP promise to rigorously watch over and challenge the DPP government!)

I warned you that this post wouldn’t flatter the KMT, but I feel like I should say one nice thing about the KMT’s weekend, so here goes. They managed to retract Hung Hsiu-chu’s nomination without inciting a rebellion. Good job.

However, …

No, I’m going to stop there.

9 Responses to “Two weekend events”

  1. Jerry O'Donnell Says:

    A bit of nit picking: I’m not sure the KMT fits the Leninist or National Socialist models but sure there are parallels!
    “Leninism is the body of political theory for the democratic organisation of a revolutionary vanguard party, and the achievement of a dictatorship of the proletariat, as political prelude to the establishment of socialism… the vanguard party who led the fight for the political independence of the working class.
    v.s
    Nazism “It rejected the Marxist concept of class struggle, opposed ideas of class equality and international solidarity, and sought to defend private property and businesses… claimed that communism was dangerous to the well-being of nations because of its intention to dissolve private property, its support of class conflict, its aggression against the middle class, its hostility towards small business, and its atheism.[193] Nazism rejected class conflict-based socialism and economic egalitarianism, favouring instead a stratified economy with social classes based on merit and talent, retaining private property, and the creation of national solidarity that transcends class distinction.”
    In 1924, Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang to spend three months in Moscow studying the political and military system of the Soviet Union. Chiang met Leon Trotsky and other Soviet leaders, but quickly came to the conclusion that the Soviet model of government was not suitable for China. This laid the beginning of his lifelong antagonism against communism.”
    “.. the KMT under Chiang’s leadership aimed at establishing a centralized one-party state with one ideology. This was even more evident following Sun’s elevation into a cult figure after his death. The control by one single party began the period of “political tutelage,” whereby the party was to lead the government while instructing the people on how to participate in a democratic system.
    ” In The Birth of Communist China, C.P. Fitzgerald describes China under the rule of KMT thus: “the Chinese people groaned under a regime Fascist in every quality except efficiency.”

    • frozengarlic Says:

      The KMT incorporated some fascist ideas in the 1920s and 1930s, but Fitzgerald is probably overstating things. Fascism was never the core ideal for the KMT regime. After the KMT moved to Taiwan, fascism ceased to be a prominent part of KMT ideas or practice. Leninism, on the other hand, has been at the core of KMT thought since Sun reorganized the party in the early 1920s. Unfortunately, it seems to still be a prominent idea, even though Leninism and pluralist multiparty democracy do not mix.

  2. Greg (@greghao) Says:

    I wonder if it is possible for the KMT to ever evolve out of the l’etat c’est moi mentality. For the upper crust types like Ma and Lien, they are stuck in the mindset that the return to China is all but inevitable. As you posit in the piece above, it’s going to take a crushing defeat or two (and probably laws passed where the KMT has to give up their party assets thereby depriving them the ability to “sway” elections).

  3. Mr. Wang Says:

    One major difference between Taiwan and other democracies is that the opposing political parties don’t exactly agree on what the “state” is. Sure, the DPP currently competes within the confines of the ROC, but if they were able to get their way the ROC would be replaced with a Republic of Taiwan. Perhaps this is why the KMTers still feel so intertwined with the ROC, if they lose everything the state they love may be swept into the dustbin of history.

    • frozengarlic Says:

      This is a good point. Fundamentalists on both sides do not inhabit their ideal state. Taiwan nationalists would love to ditch the ROC for an ROT and Chinese nationalists are dissatisfied that their state doesn’t actually encompass China. However, in between those two groups there is a surprisingly large pragmatic consensus built around LTH’s ROC on Taiwan idea. I don’t have any survey evidence on hand, but I’ve seen plenty of data indicating that overwhelming majorities are happy with the ROC shell and believe that the territory of the state includes Taiwan and the usual assorted islands. Surprisingly, it is the DPP that seems to have decided that it can live with the ROC on Taiwan. The KMT seems to have been seized by the deep blue forces who can’t accept that and who are thus extremely out of line with mainstream public opinion.

      • csempere109 Says:

        Speaking of “Taiwan nationalists” – why is it common for the press to use “Taiwan” as an adjective, instead of “Taiwanese”?

      • frozengarlic Says:

        It is true that we speak of French nationalism or German nationalism rather than France or Germany nationalism. For some reason, Taiwan nationalism sounds more appropriate. Perhaps this is because the term Taiwanese is so ambiguous. It is used as an adjective for all people living in Taiwan, people whose ancestors were in Taiwan before 1945, or just ethnic Min-nan (Hoklos). To my ears, Taiwanese nationalism could easily mean Min-nan chauvinism. I’m certainly not going to object if you want to say Taiwanese nationalism, though.

  4. Wayne Says:

    Your line; “The KMT is trying not to implode, so it wants desperately to consolidate its previous support. This leads it to look inward.” could have been composed to describe the this weeks election in Canada and the ousted Prime Minister Harper and his Conservative party.
    Good article Ben.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: