What does Soong want?

Why is James Soong insisting on running for president?  Why is he risking throwing the presidential election to the DPP?  Everyone has an answer, and so do I.  However, I think my answer is a little more boring than most others.  I think Soong sees an opportunity to become a critical power center again.  The key is to stop thinking about the presidential race and start thinking about the legislative race, something no one seems to want to do.  There is a reasonable chance that the PFP could win enough seats to deny either of the two big parties a majority in the legislature.  If that happens, regardless of whether Ma or Tsai is the president, they will have to go to Soong for help if they want to pass any legislation.

 

Here’s the quick version of the argument.  There are 113 seats in the legislature.  Most people think the DPP can win about 50.   The PFP could easily win seven seats.  That would leave the KMT with 56 seats.  Let the wooing begin!

Where would the PFP get 7 seats?  Well, there are two aboriginal candidates, one of whom (Lin Cheng-er 林正二) is a very good bet to win and the other of whom (Wallis Belin 瓦歷斯貝林) has about a 50-50 shot.  Chen Fu-hai 陳福海 is the incumbent in Jinmen, so you have to take him seriously.  In Hualien, Chang Chih-chao 張智超 is running as an independent, but he is a puppet for county executive and PFP loyalist Fu Kun-chi.  With 8% of the party list vote, the PFP should get three seats.  That’s seven.

Note that only one of those seven came from seats that the DPP has a chance to win.  The single seat that the PFP might be taking from the DPP is in the party list sector.  However, even that isn’t quite clear, since most of the PFP party list votes probably come out of the blue camp’s pool of supporters.  Moreover, the PFP doesn’t necessarily have to win all seven seats.  The DPP could easily win 52 or 53 seats.  (I’m on record as saying that it isn’t out of the question that the DPP could even win an outright majority.  However, that would remove all of the PFP’s bargaining power.)

It’s amazing.  This outcome is a very realistic possibility, and I have yet to see any mention of it in the media.  As far as I know, no one has uttered the magic phrase 三黨不過半 yet.  They should start thinking about it.

So that’s what Soong is thinking about, and that’s why he is campaigning hard.

 

Now for the longer version.

Soong is never going to be president.  He’s not going to win this year, and he is already 69 years old.  I’m sure he understands this.  However, it seems clear that he is not ready to retire and become a doddering party elder with no power, like Lien Chan or Wu Po-hsiung.  With all the enemies he has made in the KMT over the last decade and a half, that might not even be an option.

Soong has three options.  He can merge with the KMT, cooperate with the KMT, or compete with the KMT.

He could completely merge his party with the KMT.  However, the two parties are not equals any longer.  The PFP would be absorbed into the KMT, and none of its members would be moving to the center of power.  At his age, Soong can’t realistically hope to take over the party and lead it.  This also holds for most of the PFP members.  Take Huang Shan-shan 黃珊珊.  She is one of the PFP’s most capable members.  She handles most of the party’s legal challenges, and is a charismatic spokeswoman.  What if she joined the KMT?  The KMT has dozens of Taipei City Council members, not to mention dozens of legislators, cabinet members, and countless other elected officials.  Who has a higher profile, PFP member Huang Shan-shan or KMT member Lin Yi-hua 林奕華?  Nearly every PFP member with enough personal status to survive the move to the KMT has already made the leap.  The people still in the PFP are probably better off as big fish in a small party.

What about cooperation?  Four years ago, the PFP tried the cooperation strategy, and it was a complete disaster.  Let’s go back and look at how the PFP fell apart.  A lot, but not all of it, has to do with the new electoral system.  In 2004, the PFP elected 34 legislators.  When the new electoral system was passed, a lot of these legislators made the strategic decision that the best way to survive was to win the KMT nomination.  12 legislators defected to the KMT in 2005 and 2006.  There wasn’t much the PFP could do about these 12.  They effectively opted for the first strategy, merging, whether Soong liked it or not.  However, that still left 22 legislators who didn’t defect.  In 2008, the PFP decided to cooperate with the KMT.  PFP members joined the KMT, were nominated by the KMT, and ran under the KMT’s banner.  The PFP even got three spots on the KMT’s party list.  In the table, these people are marked as having left the PFP for the “election.”  Nine legislators won seats this way, three on the party list and six in districts.  (Two others lost.)  Where are those nine people today, now that the PFP wants to assert its independent identity?  Eight are still in the KMT.  The lone exception is Hualien County Executive Fu Kun-chi, who is not in the legislature.  The other eight were simply absorbed back into the KMT.  From Soong’s point of view, they are no longer his soldiers.  They don’t answer to him at all.  Collaboration has been a disaster for the PFP.  All it achieved was to transform eleven PFP legislators into KMT members.

 

Name Name   Leave PFP 2008 election
張顯耀 Chang Hsien-yao D Election KMT list
邱毅 Chiu Yi D 05.5.23 KMT list
李永萍 Lee Yong-ping D 06.1.27 Resigned 07.1.23, DNR
林郁方 Lin Yu-fang D 06.1.25 KMT district
李慶安 Dianne Lee D 06.2.14 KMT district
周錫瑋 Chou Hsi-wei D 05.4.13 Resigned 05.12.20, Taipei County
吳清池 Wu Ching-chih D Election KMT district
柯淑敏 Ko Shu-ming D Election KMT district (lost)
李鴻鈞 Lee Hung-chun D Election KMT district
李慶華 Lee Ching-hua D 05.6.3 KMT district
林德福 Lin Te-fu D 06.1.27 KMT district
鄭金玲 Cheng Chin-ling D Election KMT list
孫大千 Sun Ta-chien D 06.1.27 KMT district
徐耀昌 Hsu Yao-chang D Election KMT district
馮定國 Feng Ting-kuo D DNR
陳朝容 Chen Chao-rung D 06.6.17 IND district (lost)
陳志彬 Chen Chih-pin D 06.1.27 DNR
鍾紹和 Chung Shao-ho D Election KMT district
趙良燕 Chao Liang-yen D DNR
傅崐萁 Fu Kun-chi D Election KMT district (now back in PFP)
謝國樑 Hsieh Kuo-liang D 06.4.17 KMT district
呂學樟 Lu Hsueh-chang D Election KMT district
沈智慧 Chen Chih-hwei D IND district (lost)
黃義交 Hwang Yi-jiau D Election KMT district
高思博 Kao Su-po D 06.2.3 KMT district (lost)
林正二 Lin Cheng-er A PFP aborigines
林春德 Lin Chung-te A PFP aborigines (lost)
李復甸 Li Ful-dien L   Entered LY 07.1.18, DNR
林惠官 Lin Hui-kuan L DNR
蔡勝佳 Tsai Sheng-jia L DNR
劉文雄 Liu Wen-hsiung L DNR
鍾榮吉 Chung Jung-chi L DNR
羅淑蕾 Lo Shu-lei L Election Entered LY 07.11.26, KMT list
劉憶如 Christina Liu L Resigned 07.11.20, DNR
顧崇廉 Ku Chung-lien L Died 07.1.15, DNR
梅長錡 Marr Chang-chi L DNR
         

 

This time, Soong and the PFP are trying the third strategy, competition.  They have to figure out how to build a new party with elected members who can survive in this new system and will not feel a need to defect to the KMT.  The PFP’s strategy is built around three types of legislators.  First, they need to win some seats on the party list.  Look at the table above.   In 2004, the PFP elected 25 people from the districts.  12 of these defected.  They won 7 seats on the party list, and two other people got list seats when they were vacated.  Not a single one of these nine people quit the party.  (Lo Shu-lei joined the KMT and won a spot on the KMT’s list, but that was part of the collaboration strategy and was encouraged by the PFP leaders.)  In fact, party list members can’t be disloyal.  If they piss off party leaders, the leaders can kick them out of the party.  If they lose their party membership, they lose their seats.  So if the PFP can win three list seats, it is assured of three loyal soldiers.

Second, the PFP is targeting aboriginal seats.  The main reason it is doing this is that Soong still has a high level of popularity with many aboriginal voters.  However, it is also critical that the aboriginal seats are still elected under the old system.  They have two three seat districts instead of six single seat districts.  A PFP legislator can survive in a three seat district.

Third and most difficult, the PFP hopes to win a couple of seats in overwhelmingly blue districts.  Jinmen is the most obvious case, but Hualien also fits.  In these areas, the PFP should be able to compete with the KMT without necessarily throwing the seat to the DPP.  Moreover, the PFP is targeting areas where the PFP in its heyday was even more popular than the KMT.  The hope is that the PFP can win a toehold in these deep blue seats.  The challenges in Da-an, Wenshan, Zhongli, and Neihu roughly fit this pattern.  However, legislators elected in these districts will always be tempted to defect to the KMT, so these are the most tenuous seats.

There are two types of glue that can hold together a party, ideals and pork.  If the PFP can manage to become a critical minority, it will be able to extract a lot of pork.  Ideals are a different matter.  Much of the PFP’s appeal is based on Soong’s charisma, specifically the idea that Soong is the most compassionate and competent politician on the entire island.  That’s great for Soong, but it won’t hold his party together.  I think this is one reason that Soong has recently taken a much more aggressive stance on unification with China.

 

This still leaves us with the question of why Soong needs to run for president.  I believe the answer is obvious: running for president will help the PFP win party list seats.  If might help in the district races as well, though probably more in the races the PFP has little chances of winning.  The candidates in the four races I think the PFP can win aren’t relying on Soong.

Soong’s campaign for president helps in two ways.  First, it keeps the PFP on the stage.  The media is focused entirely on the presidential campaigns.  How much attention are the TSU and NP getting right now?  They won’t be participating in the presidential debates, their presidential candidates won’t be on TV, and reporters won’t be asking them what the party stands for.  They are ignorable.

Second, Soong’s hopeless presidential bid encourages sympathy votes for the party list.  Polls have shown Soong at anywhere from 7-14%.  I think most of that will evaporate.  The presidential race is very close, and most people just won’t be able to waste their vote on Soong.  I’ll be very surprised if he gets 3%.  However, that still leaves 4-11% of the electorate who like Soong and will feel somewhat guilty about not voting for him.  Psychologically, I think a lot will assuage this guilt by telling him (or his picture on the ballot), “I’m sorry I can’t vote for you, but I’ll at least vote for your party.”  I don’t think 8% is unrealistic at all.

 

So that’s why I think Soong is running for president.  We’ve all been so focused on the presidential race, that we have completely missed the PFP’s real purpose.  The legislative race is the driving force.  If Soong just happens to win enough votes to throw the presidency to Tsai Ing-wen, that will simply be an unfortunate side effect.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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5 Responses to “What does Soong want?”

  1. A-gu Says:

    Sounds dead on to me. I hadn’t looked at the figures close enough, but if Soong gets seven seats… that would be something. Except I’d fear the chances of Soong actually forming a coalition with the DPP is close to zero. It would be most exciting if he would!

  2. Little Flea Says:

    I have a question.

    “There are two types of glue that can hold together a party, ideals and pork.”

    Why pork?

    • frozengarlic Says:

      Pork is a convenient term covering all kinds of spending directed at or controlled by a particular legislator. Politicians have lots of ways to turn money into votes, and many of them are completely legal and even generally looked upon as “good behavior.” You can direct contracts to your supporters, build local projects that stimulate the local economy (eg: roads and industrial parks) or give people important services (eg: schools and hospitals), or just ensure direct payments to your constituents (eg: tax breaks and veterans stipends). Often, some of this money gets funneled back into your own treasury where you can hire more staff to do constituency service, hire a huge team of legislative aides to make you a more effective and powerful member of the legislature (the Chen Shui-bian strategy!), outspend all your competitors in campaign advertising, or just buy a lot of votes. The point is, with a lot of pork flowing, competent legislators can turn this money into votes. If the pork comes from the party (or the party’s strategic bargaining position), legislators will not want to leave the party.
      There are limits to what pork alone can achieve, but if you combine a little bit of common ideology with a lot of pork, you can build a very cohesive party. Maybe the best example of this is the old Japanese LDP.

  3. JJR Says:

    Soong’s motivations may not be all that complicated really. Obviously he cannot be President, so what he’s gunning for is 5 seats, enough to allow his party a seat at the table along with the KMT and DPP during intra-party negotiations 政黨協商. Others are likely more qualified to talk about this than I am, but the simple explanation is that during such sessions, only two legislators from each party may attend, plus the Speaker, in order to reach a bargin/compromise. Not only does this give the Speaker a tremendous amount of power, but it also evens things out among the parties since no matter how strong you are in terms of overall seats in the LY, when it comes down to the tough horsetrading, every party is reduced to two seats only. This is a lot of power for one party to have, and just think of the kingmaker role Soong could play as he plays off the KMT and DPP against each other. And all he needs is 5 seats to do it (at least that’s my understanding of how it works).

    A random blog post I found below talks about aspects of this a little bit more.

    【政黨協商(黨團協商)制度】
    依照「立法院職權行使法」的規定,院會及委員會審查議案遇有爭議時,可進行黨團協商。包括無黨籍五人以上即可組成之黨團或聯盟,在進行協商時,皆可指派代表參加。目前共有五個黨團:國民黨、民進黨、親民黨、台聯及無黨聯盟。

    【黨團協商完成後,委員不得反對】
    在黨團協商達成共識後,並簽名作成協商結論且經院會同意後,出席委員不得反對。而且經協商之議案於廣泛討論時,除經黨團要求依政黨比例派員發言外,其他委員不得請求發言。這套政黨協商制度的立法本意,乃在提升議事效率與政黨的角色功能。

    【罪惡的源頭,與扁執政成為台灣雙害】
    政黨協商的過程不公開,協商結果可以推盤委員會審查已定案的內容。在目前的協商制度,已凌駕在委員會甚至院會之上。除了表決,一個五名委員以上所組成的黨團或聯盟代表,在協商後不簽名,即可杯葛所有法案。這就是利益交換的利器。

    【政客不要臉,不肯補漏】
    政黨協商是不留紀錄的,而且歷屆委員也不知什麼叫利益規避,反而是「沒利益為何要參加協商?」馬英九既然敢選黨主席就不應該有新手上路的借口來解釋前面一年的無為,現在已是第二年的任內了,立法院政黨協商紀錄必須要透明化;參加各委員會和協商的委員都得視法案之利益,應有所規避。

    【金改、高鐵、賤賣國產、利益輸送…】
    我們常看到的一些不公不義的事情不斷的發生,一個陳水扁執政已把台灣推向萬丈深淵,又看到所有參加利益分配的人都是明目張膽的毫不忌諱的!心裡不禁產生了一個大問號,台灣沒有公理嗎?怎會讓這些人在那上下其手,貪得無厭!難道台灣的體制裡沒有制衡的力量嗎?等到了解了政黨協商的制度後才知道,萬惡之源就在立法院,其源頭就是密室作業的政黨協商!

    • frozengarlic Says:

      That makes sense if you assume the rules are fixed. However, if the PFP is the critical minority, it won’t matter if they only have four seats. They will important. One of the first rules of legislatures is that they determine internally their own rules. If they want to change those rules, they can. If the DPP won a majority and all its members hung together, it could abolish the whole inter-party negotiation mechanism, institute an extreme majoritarian system, and ride roughshod over the other parties. The KMT could have also done this at any time during the past three years. The point it, right now the most important thing is to win as many seats as possible, not to get to any specific threshold. But in a larger sense, you are absolutely right: the PFP wants a seat at the table whenever the bargaining starts.

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